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Furnish the Balance: The 1863 Roots of Hard Strategy in the American Civil War

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THE 1863 ROOTS OF HARD WAR STRATEGY IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

by

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

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ABSTRACT

FURNISH THE BALANCE: THE 1863 ROOTS OF HARD WAR STRATEGY IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

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Scholars consider U.S. Major General William T. Sherman's 1864 Meridian campaign as the origin of hard war strategy during the American Civil War. While Sherman's 1864 expedition is a clear demonstration of hard war, it did not begin there. Rather, U.S. Major General Ulysses S. Grant's planned and Sherman's implemented destruction of Jackson, Mississippi in May 1863 was their first use of hard war and is key to understanding the Union's acceptance of hard war strategy.

Chapter I and Chapter II of this thesis explore the Army of the Tennessee's march to Jackson and Sherman's destruction of the city, along with Colonel Benjamin Grierson's deep penetration raid into Mississippi and General Order No. 100. Then, as a case study, Chapter III examines the Union's targeting of noncombatants and their property, especially Mississippi women, during the American Civil War.

To prove that the Union first applied hard war strategy during the 1863 Vicksburg campaign, this thesis examines the diaries and letters of Jackson residents, contemporary news reports, and Grant and Sherman's memoirs and correspondence. By cross-checking these sources with the Southern Claims Commission records, this thesis reveals that the Union's destruction of Jackson was a key part of their evolving acceptance of hard war, in which Grant and Sherman began realizing the strategic effectiveness of attacks on both private property and military material.

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INTRODUCTION

. . .make the country furnish the balance.
– Ulysses S. Grant[1]

After the U.S. Navy's 1862 capture of New Orleans, as part of Brevet Lieutenant General Winfield Scott's Anaconda Plan, President Abraham Lincoln remarked, "Vicksburg is the key. . . let us get Vicksburg and all that country is ours, the war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket."[2] Yet Vicksburg remained unscathed and the U.S. Navy's offensive stagnated in lower Louisiana. To conquer the bluff city, the Union would need to abandon conventional warfare and implement a new strategy.

If Vicksburg was the key to Union victory in the West, the town of Jackson, Mississippi was the key to Vicksburg. Nonetheless by spring 1863, U.S. Major General Ulysses S. Grant had made four unsuccessful attempts to subdue Vicksburg by conventional means. Pressured by Lincoln and Major General Henry Halleck to seize the city, Grant opted for a new type of warfare – hard war. With Grant's acceptance of this strategy in May 1863, the Union's strategy towards the Confederacy began to evolve to include hard war. Furthermore, the 1863 Vicksburg campaign would serve as the Federal Army's rehearsal for their infamous hard war policies of 1864 and 1865.

Two terms are vital for this thesis to be understood: hard war and total war. This thesis employs historian Mark Grimsley's definition of hard war, which has two key attributes. First, Grimsley defines hard war policies as actions against Southern civilians

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[1] Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs* (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1885), 262.

[2] David Dixon Porter, *Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1885), 95-96; Michael Ballard, *Vicksburg: The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 24-45.

and property made exclusively to demoralize Southern civilians and ruin the Confederate economy. Second, Grimsley notes that the implementation of hard war involved the allocation of substantial military resources.[3] Along with hard war, scholars commonly use the term total war. Historian William J. Philpott defines total war as "the destruction of civilian property and morale becomes as much an objective as the defeat of the enemy's armed forces, and victory is determined by the productivity of the industrial economy and the resilience of civilian morale as much as the size and effectiveness of the armed forces."[4] Although this definition closely resembles that of hard war, the disparity lies with Philpott's emphasis on "industrial economy." The South was not an entirely industrial society.[5] So while the Union Army did attack the South's economic productivity, Federal commanders primarily limited their destruction to plantations and farms (which this thesis considers to be private property). Therefore, the term hard war describes the Union commanders' actions and goals most fittingly.

Historians consider Union Major General William T. Sherman's more popular and protracted February 1864 Meridian campaign as the roots of hard war strategy.[6]

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[3] Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 3.

[4] William J. Philpott, "Total War," in *Palgrave Advances: Modern Military History*, ed. Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpott (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 131-152.

[5] John Hebron Moore, *The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in the Southwest: Mississippi, 1770-1860* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 19-36.

[6] Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians 1861-1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Buckley T. Foster, *Sherman's Mississippi Campaign* (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2006); Ballard, *Vicksburg*; Michael Ballard, *The Civil War in Mississippi: Major Campaigns and Battles* (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2011); Margie Riddle Bearrs, *Sherman's Forgotten Campaign: The Meridian Expedition* (Baltimore: Gateway Press, 1987); Timothy B. Smith, *Mississippi and the Civil War: The Home Front* (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2010); Paul F. Paskoff, "Measures of War: A Quantitative Examination of the Civil War's Destructiveness in the Confederacy," *Civil War History* 54 (March 2008) 1: 35-62; John B. Walters, "General William T. Sherman and Total War," *Journal of Southern History* 14 (November 1948): 447-80; John B. Walters, *Merchant of Terror: General Sherman and Total War* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973); Clay Mountcastle, *Punitive War: Confederate Guerrillas and Union Reprisals* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009).

While Meridian was a clear demonstration of hard war, it did not begin there. It was not, as historian Buckley T. Foster argues, "the dress rehearsal" for Sherman's March to the Sea.[7] Rather, Grant's planned and Sherman's implemented destruction of Mississippi's capital in mid-May 1863, along with Grant's inland campaign, was their first use of hard war.

The Union Army of the Tennessee's march to and from Jackson, coupled with Sherman's destruction of that city, trained the Union high command in the West for the application of a similar strategy in Virginia, Georgia, and South Carolina in 1864 and 1865. The destructive actions Grant and Sherman allowed to occur in 1863, combined with Colonel Benjamin Grierson's raid, laid the foundation for the Grant's 1864 Overland campaign, Sherman's march through Georgia and the Carolinas, and Major General Philip H. Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley campaign. While historians widely accept the later operations as hard war, the most striking – and least understood – quality of these campaigns is that they can all be linked to the Union's 1863 Vicksburg campaign.[8] Historians need to examine Grant's 1863 Vicksburg campaign as more than an important Union victory. The 1863 Vicksburg campaign began the evolution of Union strategy during the American Civil War.

Historians, such as Warren Grabau, Michael Ballard, Edwin Bearrs, and Terrence Winschel, have already produced numerous studies of the operations near Vicksburg and the campaign's operational significance. In his 2004 work, *Vicksburg: The Campaign*

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[7] Foster, *Sherman's Mississippi Campaign*, x.

[8] John G. Barrett, *Sherman's March through the Carolinas* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956); Burke Davis, *Sherman's March: The First Full-Length Narrative of General William T. Sherman's Devastating March through Georgia and the Carolinas* (New York: Random House, 1980).

that Opened the Mississippi, Ballard argues that hard war, which he defines as "more of an attitude of taking the means of making war from the enemy. . .became sharply defined during the Vicksburg campaign."[9] However, Ballard does not focus on Jackson's importance or Grant's inland campaign.[10] Ballard argues that hard war mostly appeared closer to Vicksburg's city limits and resulted largely in response to guerilla warfare.[11] So while Ballard challenges some long-accepted analyses of the campaign, he neglects the Union Army's destruction of Jackson.

Warren Grabau also reviews Grant's advance on Jackson in May 1863 in his book *Ninety-eight Days: A Geographer's View of the Vicksburg Campaign*. Along with effectively illustrating Grant's reasons for nullifying the capital city, Grabau details the railroad's importance to both Grant and Confederate Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton's strategic goals in the region. In fact, Grabau rightly observes that "the destruction of these industries – [an arsenal, railroad yards and shops, spinning mills, foundries, tanneries, and food depots] – would be felt deeply by the Confederate government."[12] However, Grabau overlooks Sherman's destruction of Jackson and its connection to the Union's acceptance of hard war.

Although this thesis does not examine Grant's operations near Vicksburg between January and April 1863, it does engage many other historiographical debates. Primarily, it speaks to the Union's adoption of hard war/total war strategy or the "How the North Won" debate. Additionally, it interacts with the debates on Grant and Sherman's

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[9] Ballard, *Vicksburg*, xii.
[10] Ballard, *Vicksburg*, 222.
[11] Ballard, *Vicksburg*, xii.
[12] Warren E. Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days: A Geographer's View of the Vicksburg Campaign* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2000), 240.

propensity for destructive war and Mississippi's Civil War experience and strategic importance. Scholars have produced ample literature for each of these historical discussions and the Union's use of destructive war permeates each one. However, in spite of the many impressive studies, Civil War historians have neglected the strategic importance of Grant's Inland campaign and Grant's ordered and Sherman's executed destruction of Jackson, Mississippi in 1863 – this thesis bridges that gap.

Works that analyze hard war, total war, or modern warfare strategies in the Civil War are growing, but the historiography remains incomplete.[13] Three of the best examples are Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones' *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, Mark Grimsley's *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*, and Charles Royster's *The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans*.[14] While these are essential works on Federal policy, their authors neglect the 1863 Vicksburg campaign as the origin of the Union's hard war strategy.

Hattaway and Jones launched the discussion of the Union's changing policies with their 1983 work.[15] Their book summarizes Federal military strategy, but Hattaway and Jones do not adequately explore the Vicksburg campaign's significance to hard war. Their study satisfies the expectations of an operational history, but lacks an in-depth analysis of the Mississippi campaigns. This oversight could be understandable except for the fact that 1863 Mississippi is crucial to some of their central arguments.

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[13] Bruce Catton, *Grant Moves South* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1960).

[14] Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*; Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War* (Champaign, IL: University Press of Illinois, 1983); Charles Royster, *The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).

[15] Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won.*

Grimsley attempted to fill the void with his 1995 book, which tracks Union strategy throughout the war. By combining military history, diplomatic history, and political history, Grimsley argues that by late 1863 the Federal government's initial program of conciliation had failed. Hoping to end the war by demoralizing Southern civilians and ruining the Confederate economy, the Union gradually adopted a destructive war approach, especially with General Order No. 100. This order, as part of early hard war strategy, allowed Union forces to confiscate and destroy enemy property, especially that of hostile civilians and guerilla combatants.[16]

Nonetheless, Grimsley underrepresents the importance of Grant's activities in Mississippi. After briefly recounting the Vicksburg campaign's engagements, Grimsley comments, "In most respect they formed clear examples of the emergent hard war strategy. But they were not yet intended to achieve results independently of the traditional battlefield orientation."[17] Grimsley further states "neither Grant nor anyone else saw this destruction as anymore than an unfortunate byproduct of military necessity."[18] Grimsley overlooks that neither Grant nor Sherman seemed vexed by this "unfortunate byproduct," nor were they hesitant to use such in the future. Moreover, as Chapter I explains below, to completely define hard war as occurring devoid of conventional military strategy distorts the notion by creating a false dichotomy. Rather, it was this campaign that first illuminated hard war's benefits as dependent and independent of battlefield orientation. The Vicksburg campaign was more than, as Grimsley suggests, conventional warfare. Instead, it was the cradle of hard war.

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[16] Nicknamed for its author, Francis Leiber, this order outlined proper military conduct, such as the treatment of guerrillas, hospital locations, and flags of truce.

[17] Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 157.

[18] Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 157.

Along with Grimsley, Royster's 1991 *The Destructive War* explores the devastating nature of warfare. His chapters on Sherman are especially exhaustive and enrich the hard war scholarship. Yet Royster ignores the Mississippi campaign and focuses on Sherman's 1864 incursions. This is likely due to the brevity of the Jackson, Mississippi raid in comparison to the March to the Sea and the broad focus of Royster's work. However, an analysis of the Jackson campaign is fundamental to understanding the significance of Royster's larger arguments.

Fueled by World War I, World War II, and European historians, some scholars contend that Grant's demand for unconditional surrender transformed the Civil War into the first modern war – a total war. The persistence of unconditional surrender into and throughout the twentieth-century corroborates this argument.[19] As a result, several scholars propose that the Civil War was not a unique hard war phenomenon, but rather the beginning to the twentieth-century's total war method.

The other side of the debate suggests that the Civil War was not the start of a new, modern way of war, but a continuation of brutal armed conflict.[20] For instance, Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh argues that "harsh critiques of Civil War violence as harbingers of twentieth-century brutality share with Whiggish narratives the unproven assumption that the American Civil War forged a fulcrum point not just for American history, but for the

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[19] Mark E. Neely, "Was the Civil War a Total War?," *Civil War History* 50 (December 2004) 4: 434-458; John F. Marszalek, "The Inventor of Total Warfare," *Notre Dame Magazine* 18 (Summer 1989): 28-31; Hugh Dubrelle, "A Military Legacy of the Civil War: The British Inheritance," *Civil War History* 49 (June 2003) 2: 153-180; Charles Strozier, *Unconditional Surrender and the Rhetoric of Total War: From Truman to Lincoln* (New York: Center on Violence and Human Survival, 1987); James M. McPherson, *Lincoln and the Strategy of Unconditional Surrender* (Gettysburg: Gettysburg College, 1984), 11-13, 23-24; William J. Philpott, "Total War," in *Palgrave Advances: Modern Military History*, ed. Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpott (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 131-152.

[20] Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh, "Total War and the American Civil War Reconsidered: The End of an Outdated 'Master Narrative,'" *The Journal of the Civil War Era* 1 (September 2011) 3: 394-408.

modern world."[21] Rather, European armies implemented destructive strategy successfully throughout the medieval period and the pre-modern period. Consequently, it continued through to the modern period.

Likewise, other military historians ask "compared to what?" in regards to the Civil War's brutality. Military historian Robert Citino illuminates that, comparatively, the American Civil War was not incredibly bloody or devastating.[22] This thesis is not as concerned with taking a position in this debate as it is with hard war's role in America's defining conflict. What matters here is that military commanders began the war with conventional strategy, which targeted only traditional military objectives. Then, in mid-1863, with the support of Lincoln and Halleck, Grant introduced hard war in an effort to seize Vicksburg, nearly a year earlier than most historians have recognized.

In addition to monographs on the Union's destructive policies, numerous scholars have examined Mississippi's Civil War experience.[23] These works range from campaign histories to social history analyses, but their authors still ignore the Jackson raid's larger repercussions. Timothy B. Smith provides the necessary background of Jackson, its importance to the war effort, and Vicksburg's eventual collapse, but his description of Sherman's May occupation is brief.[24] Similarly, Ballard only allocates a few pages to Jackson's destruction in his 2011 *The Civil War in Mississippi: Major Campaigns and*

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[21] Hsieh, "Total War and the American Civil War," 394.

[22] Robert M. Citino, review of *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction*, by Mark E. Neely, H-CivWar, H-Net Reviews (August, 2009).

[23] Historians Michael Ballard, Timothy B. Smith, Margie Riddle Bearrs, Edwin Bearrs, Buckley T. Foster, and Warren Grabau are only a few scholars who have produced examinations of these campaigns. Ballard, Vicksburg; Ballard, *The Civil War in Mississippi*; Bearrs, *Sherman's Forgotten Campaign*; Smith, *Mississippi and the Civil War*; Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days.*

[24] Smith, *Mississippi and the Civil War*, 4-7.

Battles.[25] Grabau's geographic study of the Vicksburg campaign also briefly reviewed the battle and Sherman's subsequent damage of the city.

Using the term "total war" to describe the Union's strategy, Smith discusses its affect on Confederate morale and motivation.[26] Disputing the "lack of will" thesis, Smith maintains that Mississippians possessed "a definite will to win even to the end."[27] Smith admits that Sherman's total war tactics, and the fall of Jackson and Vicksburg, weakened Mississippians' resolve. As with Georgia, Alabama, and the Carolinas, Federal devastation might have challenged Mississippians' resolve, but Smith contends that they did not surrender easily.[28]

According to Smith, Mississippi's defeat was twofold. It included the collapse of the state's infrastructure – at the hand of Northern troops – and the growing Unionist and African-American contingent in the state. With the Emancipation Proclamation and the Federal Army's expeditions through the state, many enslaved blacks fled their plantations and joined Union supporters to challenge the weakened state government. Smith thus analyzes total war's impact in the state, but he does not discuss its relationship to the larger Union war effort.[29]

Incorporating the *Official Records* and other secondary military histories, Ballard's 2011 work impressively reviews Grant's inland campaign and concentrates on

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[25] Ballard, *Vicksburg*, 280-281; Ballard, *The Civil War in Mississippi.*

[26] Smith, *Mississippi and the Civil War*, 68.

[27] Smith, *Mississippi and the Civil War*, 2-4. For more works that discuss the "lack of will" thesis, see Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr., *Why the South Lost the Civil War* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986); E. Merton Coulter, *The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950); Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won.*

[28] Smith, *Mississippi and the Civil War*, 3.

[29] Smith, *Mississippi and the Civil War*, 68.

Grant's conventional tactics and inner-army politics.[30] Though the book is fundamentally a campaign history, it still does not address hard war's 1863 origins in Mississippi. Ballard's earlier study, *Vicksburg: The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi,* however, does engage the debate, noting that hard war appeared during the Vicksburg campaign.[31] Ballard argues that Grant and Sherman implemented hard war policies on Vicksburg's outskirts, but not during Grant's inland campaign.[32] In fact, Ballard overlooks Grant's ordered confiscation and destruction of wagons, cotton, and draft animals between 30 April and 15 May 1863.

This thesis agrees with Ballard's chronology of hard war's appearance, but not the geographic location or Union commanders' motives. Ballard views hard war as retaliation to guerilla activities. When applied to General Order No. 100 and General Order No. 60, which stated that guerrillas or hostile persons would have their items confiscated as punishment, Ballard's hypothesis is valid.[33] However, when Grant ordered the abandonment of his supply lines and the pillaging of Mississippi's countryside he did not cite guerillas as the threat that inspired the policy.[34] Consequently, Ballard's thesis falls short when applied to the entire 1863 Vicksburg campaign.

Edwin and Margie Bearrs also skim Jackson's destruction in their respective campaign histories. Edwin Bearrs and Warren Grabau's collaborative battle history is

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[30] Ballard, *The Civil War in Mississippi*, 103-107, 140-144. For more information, see Ballard, *Vicksburg*.

[31] Ballard, *Vicksburg*, xii.

[32] Ballard, *Vicksburg*, 222.

[33] Joan Waugh, *U.S. Grant: American Hero, American Myth* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 60.

[34] Grant, *Memoirs*, 229.

one of the most complete portraits of the battle at Jackson.[35] However, Bearrs and Grabau overlook Sherman's subsequent destruction of the city. Recognizing this void, Buckley T. Foster offered his own examination of Grant's hard war strategy. Like his predecessors, though, Foster disregards Jackson and cites the Meridian campaign in winter 1863 and 1864 as the beginning of hard war strategy. Aiming to provide a thorough study of the development of Sherman's "unique style of warfare," Foster contends, "Sherman's experiences in his march across the Magnolia State shaped and solidified his style of warfare for the rest of the conflict."[36]

This thesis agrees with much of Foster's argument – Sherman's march across Mississippi did shape his hard war policies of 1864. Yet Foster aligns himself with the standing historiography by placing this evolution a year too late. Sherman's destruction of Jackson in May 1863 *was* the rehearsal, not his later and lengthier Meridian Expedition. Although Foster places the switch to hard war in early 1864, he understands that Union commanders did not develop this style quickly. Instead, Foster suggests that Sherman cultivated hard war strategy, as did Grant, throughout the war. Moreover, Foster rightly compares Grant's use of hard war in Mississippi and Sherman's tactics in Georgia and the Carolinas, but Foster fails to recognize the Vicksburg campaign as hard war's debut.

Scholars have also studied Grant's military career, his proclivity for hard war, and

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[35] Bearrs, *Sherman's Forgotten Campaign*; Edwin Bearrs and Warren Grabau, *The Battle of Jackson May 14, 1863, The Siege of Jackson July 10-17, 1863, Three Other Post-Vicksburg Actions* (Baltimore: Gateway Press, 1981).

[36] Foster, *Sherman's Mississippi Campaign*, x.

unconditional surrender.[37] Some historians argue that Grant possessed the "good American common sense, to recognize the need to wage modern, total war against the South, and the will to do so brilliantly."[38] While some admire Grant's use of total war or attritional warfare, others condemn Grant's actions and label him a "butcher."[39] This thesis will not engage this debate, but it does take issue with scholars who limit their discussion to Grant's 1864 Overland campaign. For scholars to understand Grant and Sherman's contribution to Civil War strategy and modern warfare, they must examine their earlier campaigns.

Joan Waugh discusses Grant's shift to hard war during the Vicksburg campaign in her discussion of his Civil War experiences. Yet she fails to recognize hard war's origins in 1863.[40] Grant discusses his own transformation in his memoirs after recalling the battle of Shiloh. Grant remarks that "[he] gave up all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest."[41] Therefore, with this revelation and the abundant secondary literature, this thesis does not question Grant's personal reasons for hard war.[42] However, this thesis will explore when hard war originated, how it developed, and how Federal troops similarly implemented it on Sherman's march through Georgia and the Carolinas and Grant's Overland campaign. It stresses that Grant and Sherman did not fashion hard

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[37] Ethan Rafuse, "Still A Mystery?: General Grant and the Historians, 1981-2006," *The Journal of Military History* 71 (July 2007) 3: 849-874.

[38] Bruce Catton, *U.S. Grant and the American Military Tradition* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1954); Catton, *Grant Moves South*; Bruce Catton, *Grant Takes Command* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1968); T. Harry Williams, *The History of American Wars: From 1745 to 1918* (New York: Knopf, 1981), 252–53, 268–71, 286–88, 293–302.

[39] Rafuse, "Still A Mystery?" 856; William S. McFeely, *Grant: A Biography* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981).

[40] Waugh, *U.S. Grant*, 60-61.

[41] Grant, *Memoirs*, 193.

[42] Clay Mountcastle, *Punitive War: Confederate Guerrillas and Union Reprisals* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009).

war overnight, nor did such tactics only transpire during prolonged, incredibly devastating campaigns like the March to the Sea and the Overland campaign.

Historians have also examined Sherman's switch to hard war.[43] Sherman's biographers commonly explore his destructive policies against Southern civilians and property. Michael Fellman argues that Sherman played a central role in hard war's development and execution; but Fellman, like Margie Bearrs, attributes his strategy to his psyche.[44] Bearrs, along with Buckley T. Foster, maintain that Sherman's transformation was in direct response to his son's death. Foster also contends that Sherman chose hard war in retaliation for the actions of Southern guerillas. Prior to Fellman's biography, John Marszalek challenged Albert Castel's that Sherman feared direct confrontation after Shiloh and Kennesaw Mountain.[45] Marszalek asserts that Sherman believed war was between societies as much as between armies. Therefore, it had to be fought fiercely so that it could be ended quickly. Moreover, Marszalek maintains that Sherman wanted to kill the Confederacy by destroying property and the South's ability to continue the struggle.[46] Marszalek claims that Sherman especially learned these lessons in Mississippi. This thesis accepts Marszalek's argument, and further contends that Sherman realized hard war's benefits during the Vicksburg campaign and then enthusiastically implemented them later in the war.

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[43] John Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993); Michael Fellman. *Citizen Sherman: A Life of William Tecumseh Sherman* (New York: Random House, 1995); Stanley P. Hirshson, *The White Tecumseh: A Biography of General William T. Sherman* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997).

[44] Fellman, *Citizen Sherman.*

[45] Albert Castel, *Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992).

[46] John Marszalek, *Sherman*, 309-310.

To demonstrate that the Union first applied hard war in 1863, rather than later in Sherman's Meridian campaign or his March to the Sea, this thesis examines diaries and letters from numerous Jackson residents and visitors to the city. Grant and Sherman wanted the hard war strategy to demoralize the civilian population. Therefore, Southern civilians' writings are fundamental. One must examine the Union commanders' memoirs and correspondence to fully comprehend their choice to accept hard war strategy and apply it to the Vicksburg campaign. The official military reports and correspondence of Confederate generals Johnston and Pemberton also are necessary, as are the writings of U.S. President Abraham Lincoln and Confederate President Jefferson Davis. While these sources are especially enlightening, individual soldiers' opinions are also revealing. The use of both officers and soldiers' writings illustrate hard war's benefits and how Union troops implemented it during the Vicksburg campaign.

Along with the *Official Records* and personal writings, this thesis incorporates contemporary news reports, the 1860 U.S. Census, and Southern Claims Commission (SCC) records. The latter are especially helpful, because both the approved and barred reports detail the items allegedly taken by Union troops during their campaign. By comparing the SCC records to the *Official Records* and civilian writings, one can see the full impact of hard war, its successes, and Grant and Sherman's reasons for choosing this innovative strategy.

This thesis is organized into three chapters. Timothy B. Smith likened Jackson, as the state's capital and the intersection of four major rail lines, to a wheel's hub. Accordingly the first chapter, like Jackson in 1863, acts as a hub from which all other topics extend. While this is not chronological, this organization is a necessary framework

in which to discuss the evolution of Union strategy, specifically their earlier hard war actions of April 1863, as discussed in Chapter II. Within this framework, Chapter I includes a detailed discussion of Jackson's strategic importance to both Confederate and Union forces. Chapter I then explores Northern troops' destruction of the city in May 1863, Grant's orders to Sherman, and more importantly, Sherman's orders to his men. The chapter then traces Jackson's relationship to the Meridian campaign and Sherman's swath through Georgia and the Carolinas.

Maintaining a war and society methodology, the second chapter reviews Grant's 1863 overland push towards Vicksburg before his attack on Jackson. This part assesses Grant's earlier attempts to subdue the bluff city in late 1862 and early 1863. After this review, the chapter tracks Grant's movements below Vicksburg and into the heart of Mississippi. While Chapter II traces five major engagements, it is not an arrangement of battle analyses. Rather, after swiftly detailing the smaller inland campaign, the chapter reveals the operation's resemblance to Grant's notorious Overland campaign and Sheridan's burning of the Shenandoah Valley. Chapter II also explores Grant's strategic aims for Colonel Benjamin Grierson's raid, its influence on Grant's later operations in the Eastern Theater, and the raid's hard war aspects.

Working as a case study, Chapter III draws from LeeAnn Whites, Drew Gilpin Faust, Nina Silber, Catherine Clinton, and others to explore Mississippi women's experiences with hard war.[47] This section explores Union troops' destruction of private

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[47] Catherine Clinton and Nina Silber, *Battle Scars: Gender and Sexuality in the American Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); LeeAnn Whites and Alecia P. Long, *Occupied Women: Gender, Military Occupation, and the American Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2009); Catherine Clinton, "'Public Women' and Sexual Politics during the American Civil War," in Clinton and Silber, *Battle Scars*, 61; Michael Fellman, "Women and Guerilla Warfare," in Clinton and

residences and how such experiences affected civilian and soldier morale. Several Civil War historians argue that Southerners linked the public and private spheres. Therefore, Union troops' shattering of Southerners' homes, possessions, and morale would have indirectly affected the Confederate soldiers on the battlefront.

During the 1863 Vicksburg campaign, Grant and Sherman permitted (or at least ignored) their troops to ransack many upper class Jackson homes. While this was not uncommon by the end of the war, hard war strategy only started to evolve in spring 1863. Additionally, it was unusual for Federal soldiers to raid women's personal spaces without being reprimanded before 1863.[48] However, in May 1863 Grant and Sherman would allow their men to ransack women's personal spaces; and by November 1864, Sherman would permit his men to wreak havoc in an effort to demoralize the civilian population and end the war.[49] But the training ground for this happened more than a year earlier in Mississippi.

One might argue that Federals implemented hard war prior to Jackson, such as at Holly Springs in December 1862. According to Cyrus Boyd, a Yankee soldier who witnessed the Holly Spring's occupation, "The soldiers were in every house and garret

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Silber, *Divided Houses*, 147; Drew Gilpin Faust, *Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Drew Gilpin Faust, "Altars of Sacrifice: Confederate Women and the Narratives of War," in Clinton and Silber, *Divided Houses*, 171; LeeAnn Whites, *Civil War as a Crisis in Gender: Augusta, Georgia, 1860-1890* (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1995); Jacqueline Glass Campbell, *When Sherman Marched North from the Sea: Resistance on the Confederate Home Front* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Lisa Tendrich Frank, "Bedrooms as Battlefields: The Role of Gender Politics in Sherman's March" in Whites and Long, *Occupied Women*; Stephanie McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

[48] Steven J. Ramold, *Baring the Iron Hand: Discipline in the Union Army* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010), 276-277.

[49] Frank, "Bedrooms as Battlefields."

and cellar, store and church, and nook and corner."[50] While troops laid waste to the city, Union officers did not sanction these actions. In fact, Sherman and Grant winced at their soldiers' behavior.[51] In Jackson, though, Sherman urged soldiers to destroy all military materials. Moreover, neither Grant nor Sherman punished recklessness during the sack of Jackson or on the march to the city. This disparity illuminates Grant and Sherman's growing acceptance of hard war strategy one earlier than many Civil War historians have thought.

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[50] John K. Bettersworth, "Excerpt from Throne, The Civil War Diary of Cyrus F. Boyd, 96-98," *Mississippi in the Confederacy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961), 208.

[51] Grant, Memoirs, 232-242.

CHAPTER I

JACKSON

There will be nothing left of it. Nothing is safe or respected here,
but every thing destructible seems doomed to destruction. Such is war.
– U.S. Lieutenant Seth A. Ranlett [1]

Geographically, politically, and economically Jackson is the heart of Mississippi and, in 1863, it was the lifeline to Vicksburg. As the state's capital and a major industrial city, Jackson boasted the intersection of Mississippi's four railroads, numerous rail yards and equipment shops, the state arsenal, mills, foundries, and food depots.[2] Confederate war materials, packaged food items, cotton, and troops streamed from this epicenter to Mississippi's four corners. Recognizing this fact, in spring 1863 Major General Ulysses S. Grant demanded the destruction of "all possibility of aid" from Jackson to Vicksburg.[3] Grant believed that to sever military assistance to Vicksburg from the capital and consequently from the entire state would result in Vicksburg's surrender and end Confederate control in the Western Theater. This order launched the evolution of the Union's hard war policies.

The Hub

By the mid-nineteenth century, Jackson was a budding metropolis of 2,100 people.[4] Mississippi's four major railroad lines – the Southern Railroad of Mississippi from the East; the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern from the South; the Mississippi Central from the North; and the Vicksburg, Shreveport, Texas line from the

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[1] Lieutenant Seth A. Ranlett, "The Capture of Jackson," *Civil War Papers* (Boston: Commandery, 1900), 1: 351.

[2] Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days,* 240.

[3] Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 265.

[4] Joseph C. G. Kennedy, ed., U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Population of The United States in 1860; Compiled from the Original Returns of the Eight Census, under the Direction of the Secretary of the Interior* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1864).

West – all met in Jackson.[5] Converging in the northwest district of the city, this growing rail system connected the chief trade centers of Vicksburg, Natchez, Meridian, Corinth, and Grenada. During the war these lines transported civilians, troops, and staple goods, primarily cotton, in all directions.[6] Jackson's location on these lines and the Pearl River prompted many enterprising cotton producers to relocate to the city, and by 1860 Jackson surpassed Vicksburg as Mississippi's cotton-shipping epicenter.[7]

Sustained by the railways and the burgeoning industry, Jackson easily became the heart of Mississippi's war effort with many "Dixie Works," or buildings that contained forges, machinery, and war materials.[8] For example, one of Mississippi Central's storehouses kept an impressive ninety locomotives for the Confederacy's use. Along with spare engines, railroad companies also kept loose cars and lumber near the depots.[9] The Southern Railroad of Mississippi stocked approximately fifty railcars and extra lumber along their lines.[10] While private companies owned these items, the Confederate military requisitioned them as needed. The Greens, for example, owned a cotton factory and bank that the Confederate government commonly used and, at one point, seized for forty days prior to Grant's occupation of the city.[11] Moreover, the Green brothers claimed that the Confederate authorities often "seize[d] and carr[ied] off" their goods

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[5] Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, map 1.

[6] Timothy B. Smith, "Jackson: The Capital City and the Civil War," *Mississippi History Now*, Mississippi Historical Society, http://mshistory.k12.ms.us/articles/337/jackson-the-capital-city-and-the-civil-war (accessed 12 January 2011).

[7] Moore, *The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom*, 178-179.

[8] "Colonel Bussy's Expedition," *The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives* (New York, 1864), 7: 452.

[9] Ranlett, "The Capture of Jackson," 351-352.

[10] Ranlett, "The Capture of Jackson," 351-352.

[11] *Reports of Committees of House of Representatives for the Second Session of the Forty-Third Congress, 1874-1875* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1875), Report No. 5: 1.

without compensation.[12] Like these two businesses, the Confederacy expected many businesses to contribute to the war effort.

The Confederacy demanded that clothing and shoe factories, mills, and cotton gins also generate materials for the cause.[13] In May 1863, Governor John J. Pettus pressed civilians to sustain the Confederacy in Mississippi. Pettus declared, "awake, then – arouse, Mississippians, young and old, from your fertile plains, your beautiful towns and cities, your once quiet and happy but now desecrated homes, come and join your brothers in arms, your sons and neighbors, who are now bearing their bosoms to the storm of battle at your very doors and in defence [sic] of all you hold dear."[14] Many Southerners, male and female, answered the call, either by fighting or by producing goods for the cause. Grant and Sherman witnessed the Greens' factory where the female workers embroidered cloth with C.S.A. (Confederate States of America). Since such actions supported the enemy, even in this small way, Grant ordered the building and surplus cloth burned.[15] This was an early demonstration of hard war. Grant and Sherman would continue to implement such actions during their later campaigns.

Along with the railway system, Jackson featured the state's only Deaf and Dumb institute, a lunatic asylum, the state penitentiary, the Governor's Mansion, and the State House.[16] Besides containing the state's main institutions, Jackson also had Masonic, concert, and lyceum halls, and a variety of hotels and restaurants, including the Bowman

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[12] *Reports of Committees of House of Representatives,* 2.

[13] Smith, *The Home Front*, 72-75.

[14] "The Scare in Mississippi: Proclamation of Governor Pettus, Executive Office, Jackson, Miss., May 5, 1863," *New York Herald*, 20 May 1863, 3.

[15] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 754. For further discussion of Greens' mill, see Chapter III of this thesis.

[16] Van Dorn, P.A, "Original Plan for the City of Jackson, 1822," Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi. The asylums and Governor's Mansion sat on the city's western periphery, the penitentiary was positioned in northern Jackson, and the State House and City Hall were located in downtown.

House and the Confederate Hotel.[17] Not only was the city home to the Confederate Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana's (D.M.E.L.) in 1863, but it was also the cultural, political, and economic nucleus of the state.[18] Recognizing the capital's economic, political, and operational significance, Grant aimed to damage it severely enough that it could not offer any aid to Confederate Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton or General Joseph E. Johnston's forces. By debilitating the capital and the D.M.E.L.'s supply and communication base, Grant hoped to subdue Vicksburg, open the Mississippi River for the U.S. Navy, and end the war in the Western Theater.

The Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana

Grant's adversary during the entire Vicksburg campaign was the Confederacy's Department of the West, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston. It was composed of two main armies – the Army of Tennessee and Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana. General Braxton Bragg directed the Army of Tennessee (the main mobile force in the Western Theater), while Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton oversaw the D.M.E.L. Headquartered in Jackson, the D.M.E.L. – comprised of three individual garrisons and four districts with over forty thousand men – was less mobile than its larger counterpart. Some reports estimate Pemberton's department at sixty thousand troops, but due to Grant's successful diversions in spring 1863 only six thousand Confederate troops were in Jackson when Grant surrounded it.[19] Although Pemberton had remained at his Jackson headquarters until 1 May, the capital's fortifications remained unfinished and

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[17] The Confederate Hotel was previously the United States Hotel. The Eighth U.S. Census lists two confectioners, four hotelkeepers, two coffee housekeepers, four bakers, and two bar keepers. This list is most likely incomplete. Nonetheless, it does give the impression that Jackson was a growing metropolis.

[18] Moore, *The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom*, 178.

[19] A.P. Mason Report, 24 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24 pt. 3: 876.

reinforcements were days away.[20] When Pemberton finally left Jackson, it was not to intercept Grant on his march but instead to ride to Vicksburg. Pemberton's choice to abandon the capital endangered the city, cornered his troops in Vicksburg, and resulted in his surrender on 4 July 1863.

In addition to sealing his own fate, Pemberton imperiled Johnston and Brigadier General John Gregg's forces as well. Johnston did not arrive in Jackson until 13 May and only then did he learn of Sherman's wedge between him and Pemberton.[21] By the time either commander organized his troops, the vanguard of Grant's army were battling Gregg's three thousand men in the Battle of Raymond, twenty-six miles southeast of the capital.[22] Therefore, after assessing the situation on the evening of 13 May, Johnston wired President Davis in Richmond, "I am too late."[23] Nevertheless, Johnston did not immediately abandon the capital. Rather, he sent three couriers with an urgent message to Pemberton ordering him to bring the Vicksburg garrison east to attack the Federals. Yet, Johnston realized its futility, placed Gregg in command of Jackson, and ordered the military and civilian evacuation of the city. Then, Johnston and his staff rode to Canton, twenty-four miles northeast of Jackson.[24]

Hard War as a Strategy

Following Grant's four failed attempts to capture Vicksburg by conventional means between January and April 1863 and his innovative Inland campaign across

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[20] Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 244.

[21] Johnston to Pemberton, 13 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 870; Pemberton to Major General Theodore Johnston, 11 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 858; Pemberton to Johnston, 13 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 872.

[22] Gregg to Pemberton, 12 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 862; *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 739; Pemberton to Bowen or Loring, 12 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 861. Gregg's forces fought McPherson's troops at the Battle of Raymond on 12 May 1862, ending in Union victory.

[23] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 215; Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 246.

[24] William Tecumseh Sherman, *Personal Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman* (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1891), 297; Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 247.

Mississippi's southeastern quadrant, Grant advanced on Jackson with his three corps commanders – Major General William T. Sherman, Major General John A. McClernand, and Major General James McPherson.[25] Grant permitted his troops to pillage during their march to Jackson and now that they were at the city's limits, he allowed them to continue their destruction.

Grant and Sherman's 1863 acceptance of hard war may have resulted from the Federal government's 1862 Confiscation Act, which permitted Union soldiers to take items from abandoned homes. This act differed from the original 1861 Confiscation Act that punished treason with the confiscation of private property, primarily the slaves of secessionists.[26] In response to this act in an effort to protect against wanton confiscation, General George McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac in 1861, issued that private property "should not be interfered with, unless it be of military utility…and you are justified in taking measures to prevent pillage or any outrage."[27]

Sherman also, at this time, prohibited wanton destruction. In November 1861, realizing his troops' proclivity for raiding and vandalizing unoccupied homes, Sherman issued a general order that forbade such conduct and specified, "The first duty of the soldier is the protection of the citizen. The political character of the citizen is not to be judged and weighed in this manner by the soldier, and there must be by him no molestation of his lawful rights."[28] This order dictated Union military policy until an

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[25] Ballard, *Vicksburg*, 222.

[26] James McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 353-356.

[27] Lorenzo Thomas to Sherman, 22 November 1861, *OR*, vol. 6, pt. 1: 192.

[28] General Order No. 24, 11 November 1861, *OR*, vol. 6, pt. 1: 187.

increase in guerrilla activities in the Western Theater spawned the 1862 Confiscation Act.[29]

Shortly after Congress passed the 1862 Confiscation Act, Major General John Pope issued a series of general orders to seize property from traitors without compensation and to shoot captured guerilla combatants.[30] Although Pope never executed any of these orders, he laid a foundation that may have predisposed Grant and Sherman to similar actions later in the war. For example, during his 1862 Memphis occupation, Sherman banished families of suspected guerillas and confiscated their property in accordance to the Confiscation Acts. Yet, neither Grant nor Sherman permitted soldiers to pillage *en masse* until spring 1863.

Before this point, Union officers condemned such reckless use of force and supported the Union's policy of conciliation.[31] For example, in January 1863 Sherman expressed anger and disappointment at the fact that his troops committed arson in Arkansas. Sherman denounced unnecessary abuses and told his brother-in-law that he "would throw the man who started the fire into the flames if he caught him."[32] Yet just four months later when several prestigious Jackson buildings burned, Sherman just shrugged when his own troops started the fires.[33] The condemnation of mass confiscation and pillaging dictated Union military strategy until General Order No. 100 in April 1863.

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[29] McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 499.
[30] McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 501.
[31] Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 23.
[32] MS. Diary, 18 January 1863, Hugh B. Ewing Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio, quoted in Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 154.
[33] Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 297-298.

General Order No. 100, or Leiber's Code, greatly differed from the North's 1861 and 1862 Confiscation Acts and Sherman's earlier opinions of destructive warfare. Nicknamed for its author, Francis Leiber, this order outlined proper military conduct, such as the treatment of guerrillas, hospital location, and flags of truce.[34] While these are standard protocols, the document's obscure definitions of havoc and necessity made it innovative. According to Leiber's Code, "The more vigorously wars are pursued the better it is for humanity."[35] So while Leiber's Code expressively prohibits "wanton devastation," pillaging, and vandalism "even after taking a place by main force" – as in Jackson – it did not include definitions of such extremes.[36]

Historian Mark Grimsley explains that General Order No. 100 "argued that protection to enemy civilians was the exception, not the rule."[37] In fact, while the code prohibited heedless violence it did not forbid military retaliation against hostile civilians. For instance, the code states, "A victorious army appropriates all public money, seizes all public movable property until further direction by its government, and sequesters for its own benefit or of that of its government all the revenues of real property belonging to the hostile government or nation."[38] Moreover, "Private property, unless forfeited by crimes or by offenses of the owner, can be seized only by way of military necessity, for the support or other benefit of the army or of the United States. If the owner has not fled, the commanding officer will cause receipts to be given, which may serve the spoilated owner to obtain indemnity."[39] Therefore, the Federal government began allowing soldiers to

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[34] Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 150.
[35] General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863, *OR*, Series 3, vol. 3, 150-151.
[36] General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863, *OR*, Series 3, vol. 3, 151, 153; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 150.
[37] Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 150.
[38] General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863, *OR*, Series 3, vol. 3, 151.
[39] General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863, *OR*, Series 3, vol. 3, 152.

raid unoccupied homes and the homes of hostiles.

In fact, Leiber's Code actually considered hostile civilians to be equal to guerilla combatants. This was in response to increased hostility in Memphis, New Orleans, and other cities under Union occupation. As with Sherman in Memphis months earlier, according to Leiber's Code, the commanding officer determined those who deserved military protection and those who gave "positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy without being boldly forced thereto."[40] Consequently, due to this order's obscurity, the Army of the Tennessee's actions against Jackson civilians in May 1863 would have been considered just and necessary.[41]

Grant and Sherman in Jackson

On 14 May, following a three-hour fight against Gregg's battered forces, Grant marched into the heart of Mississippi and severed the lifeline to Vicksburg.[42] As Union troops raised the United States flag, Grant entered the Bowman House and summoned Sherman and McPherson to discuss Jackson's fate.[43] First, Grant demanded the demolition of the capital's railroads in every direction. Grant, like his Confederate counterparts, considered the Vicksburg, Shreveport, Texas line to be the most prized and most economically significant in Mississippi during the antebellum period. It not only boosted the cotton trade, but also linked the state's two economic and political centers. Furthermore, the Confederates relied on this line to transport reinforcements and supplies to Vicksburg.[44]

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[40] General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863, *OR*, Series 3, vol. 3, 163.
[41] Marszalek, *Sherman*, 195.
[42] Grant to McClernand, 14 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 310.
[43] Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States, April-June, 1863* (Mobile, AL: S. H. Goetzel, 1864), 110; Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 257.
[44] Moore, *The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom*, 164.

Although Grant's interest in the railroads and their depots may seem like the conventional destruction of infrastructure, Grant did not limit his destruction to conventional items or buildings. Grant also commanded his troops to destroy all the C.S.A. cotton and stores in the city. He wanted to debilitate the city for both the Confederate military and civilians. Accordingly, once Jackson had fallen to the Army of the Tennessee, troops set out to destroy the Confederacy's communication network.[45]

Grant ordered his most-trusted commander, Sherman, to demolish the rail line and all the Jackson's depots first. Grant explicitly told Sherman to "designate a brigade from [his] command to guard the city. Collect stores and forage, collect *all* public property of the enemy. . .[Direct troops] to commence immediately the effectual destruction of the river railroad bridge and the road as far east as possible, as well as north and south. . . Troops going east of the river should destroy *all* C.S.A. cotton and stores they find."[46] Grant also instructed Sherman's men to rip up all the rail line within a three to five mile radius so that Johnston could not quickly return to the city with reinforcements and attack Grant from the rear.[47]

While Grant's instructions to destroy the railroad seem like conventional warfare, it is important to consider Grant's repetition of the word "all." Grant was not ordering Sherman to demolish bridges or roads merely to protect his rear, but to nullify the city. Additionally, in spite of earlier occurrences of wanton destruction at the hands of the Union Army previously in the campaign, at places such as Holly Springs, Grant did not explicitly forbid the demolition or theft of private property. Neither did Grant

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[45] Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 256.

[46] Grant to Sherman, 14 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 312. Emphasis added.

[47] John Fiske, *The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War* (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900), 179-85.

recommend any punishments for soldiers found looting occupied homes, and years after the fact neither Grant nor Sherman seemed disturbed by civilian suffering.

For a successful Vicksburg campaign, Grant needed to incapacitate Jackson so that it could not offer any aid to the surrounding areas. He also wanted to move swiftly to avoid a major engagement with Pemberton and Johnston's forces. An attack from either enemy army could have resulted in a complete rout of Grant's army and ruin the campaign.[48] Therefore, Grant demanded that Sherman quickly abolish "all possibility of aid" at Jackson.[49]

Sherman first set out to demolish the railroads. He had his men remove the rail ties and pile them before burning them. His soldiers then commenced "twisting the rails," making them useless and creating what famously became known as "Sherman's neckties."[50] According to one of Sherman's men, "it has been determined upon to destroy all the railroads within our reach, inflicting damages of such a permanent character that they will never be rebuilt, except after a return of peace."[51] Sherman estimated the devastation's extent at four miles east, three south, three north, and ten miles west of Jackson. This was quite an accomplishment. Sherman predicted that the railroads would be of "little use to the enemy for six months," and when he returned in July the lines were still in disrepair.[52]

While railroad demolition was not uncommon and considered justifiable in war, the sanctioned damage's extent is noteworthy. Both Union and Confederate armies

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[48] Grant, *Memoirs*, 232-233; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War,* 101.
[49] Grant, *Memoirs*, 265.
[50] Michael B. Dougan, "Hermann Hirsch and the Siege of Jackson," *The Journal of Mississippi History* 53 (February 1991) 1: 23; "Colonel Bussy's Expedition," 452.
[46] "Capture of Jackson, Miss., Battle of Champion Hill Miss., Battle of Black River," *Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives* (New York: 1864) 6: 352.
[52] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 754; Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, 15 July 1863.

wrecked military items during the war. For instance, Johnston removed military material from Jackson so that the Union Army would not benefit from it. Johnston, though, was unable to take everything and Confederate troops destroyed the remainder. Johnston's damage was so drastic that "the opinion prevailed that [Johnston] was destroying the whole city."[53] With that consideration, "Sherman's neckties" do not seem unusual. However, these actions did not merely impede the enemy, but also nullified Jackson as an industrial center. The raid not only affected the Confederate military, but also the state's residents making Grant's orders and Sherman's actions in Jackson a vital part of their nascent hard war strategy. Grant's orders to Sherman illustrate the Union's growing acceptance of hard war during the Civil War.

Easily Converted, Easily Destroyed

Grant did not limit his attention to the railroads during his 1863 campaign. After ordering Sherman to destroy railroads, Grant also demanded his troops to destroy all C.S.A. in the city.[54] Accordingly, Sherman instructed his troops to make "everything public not needed by us" inoperable, which included printing presses, food provisions, the city's arsenal, the Government foundry, and a gun-carriage factory.[55] Troops also burned five hundred bales of cotton, Phillip's Southern Implement Manufacturing Company, the log mill, the flouring mill, the salt petre works, and "all shops where government work was being carried on."[56] Troops pillaged all the city's stores – "their contents either carried off or thrown in the streets and burned."[57] In addition to

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[53] "Capture of Jackson, Miss., Battle of Champion Hill Miss.," 351.
[54] Grant to Sherman, 14 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 312.
[55] Special Order No. 105, 14 May 1863, *OR,* vol. 24, pt. 3: 312.
[56] A.J. Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson in 1863," *Brandon Republican*, 21 May 1863; "What the Enemy Did to Jackson"; "Rebel Account of the Destruction of Jackson, Miss.," *New York Herald*, 2 June 1863.
[57] "Rebel Account."

Confederate war material and buildings, Union soldiers also raided the *Daily Mississippian* (newspaper) office, the post office, the Governor's mansion, and Greens' bank.[58]

Similar to the railroads, private individuals may have owned and managed each of these shops. Nonetheless, Sherman insisted that troops damage any buildings or goods that "could be easily converted to hostile uses."[59] For instance, Phillip's Factory, owned by Martin W. Phillips, Z.A. Phillips, and Robert Kells, was the only factory to produce wagon and agricultural implements for the entire state of Mississippi. The company's steam-powered factories produced both agriculture and military products during the war.[60] Therefore, Grant and Sherman labeled them Confederate property because the materials benefitted the enemy's military.[61]

Grant and Sherman's obscure definitions of private and government property form a crucial part of their early hard war strategy. Grant and Sherman were not only shattering military supplies, but also civilian morale. By ordering their troops to despoil *any* buildings or items that "could be easily converted," Union commanders approved excessive destruction and confiscation.[62] Union soldiers took advantage of this order and ransacked private homes, stole jewelry and clothing, and damaged other non-military items.[63]

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[58] "Rebel Account."

[59] Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 297.

[60] Moore, *The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom*, 219-220. In 1861, the factory began to produce cannon carriages and caissons by contract with the state of Mississippi.

[61] Special Order No. 105, 14 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 312.

[62] Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 297.

[63] Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson."

Stray Flames, Drunken Soldiers

While Grant's orders to Sherman only sanctioned the collection of "all public property," Union troops did not limit their devastation to military or public buildings. During their occupation of Jackson, Sherman's troops damaged or completely leveled numerous private, non-war related buildings. The damages included the Roman Catholic Church, a Catholic priest's personal home, the state penitentiary, and the Confederate Hotel.[64] Sherman later recalled that he "never found out exactly who set [the hotel] on fire, but [he] was told that in one of our batteries were some officers and men who had been made prisoners at Shiloh. . .and had been carried to Jackson. . .they had been permitted to go this very hotel for dinner," but the landlord refused.[65] As retaliation, these men most likely burned it.

While Sherman blamed the Confederate Hotel and Catholic Church's demise on his soldiers and "some bad rum found concealed in the stores," he maintained that inmates burned the penitentiary.[66] With the exception of these buildings, Sherman praised Brigadier General Joseph A. Mower's ability to maintain discipline.[67] Yet, SCC reports reveal the various items taken by Sherman's soldiers, and the *Brandon Republican* (Mississippi) listed many more buildings, private and government owned, destroyed or raided.[68] For instance, residents also reported that Federal soldiers destroyed Shaw's store, Mrs. Blakewell's house, and Mrs. Sander's boarding house.

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[64] Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States*, 110-111.

[65] Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 297-298.

[66] Report of Major General William T. Sherman, Fifteenth Army Corps, including Operations April 20-May 22, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 755.

[67] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 755.

[68] Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson"; "Interesting From the South: The Occupation of Jackson – Davis' Official Organ on Burnside and Vallandigham – Retaliation – Terrible Destruction of Property," *Cincinnati Daily Gazette,* 3 June 1863; "Rebel Account."

Troops also entered and defaced the Episcopal Church, the local dentist's office, the city's bookstore, the drug store, and "broke open" nearly all the private residences.[69]

Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, a European visitor traveling with the Confederate Army noted Sherman's demolition. Fremantle did not criticize the Union soldiers destruction of the railroads and factories, because they "were of course justified in doing so" in warfare.[70] Yet Fremantle did wince when he saw the ruins of the Roman Catholic Church, the priest's house, and the principal hotel. He rumored that in the thirty-six hour Union occupation, "[Sherman's] troops had wantonly pillaged nearly all the private houses. They gutted all the stores, and destroyed what they could not carry away."[71] Fremantle also affirmed that "many other buildings which could no way be identified with the Confederate Government" were smoldering.[72] SCC records confirm Fremantle's observations and noted that troops stole corn, mules, cattle, horses, wagons, potatoes, hogs, bacon, fodder, oxen, rice, along with numerous smaller items such as chains and bridles in and around the city. Along with draft animals and practical items, soldiers also confiscated carpets, quilts, household furniture, clothing, and bedding.[73] A telegraph from 16 May fully captures Jackson's devastation:

> Jackson badly sacked, burned Green's factory, Banking houses, all work shops, penitentiary, Catholic Church, Confederate House, two hospitals, block brick, burnt buildings used as Medical stores, all burnt, all stores sacked and contents destroyed, Bank safes broken open, Mississippian office gutted, presses broken, type thrown into the streets, Jackson road, Southern road torn up badly for several miles all R.R. buildings and rolling stock here burned…Furniture in State House badly abused in

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[69] "Rebel Account."
[70] Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States*, 110.
[71] Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States,* 110-111.
[72] Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States*, 111.
[73] Alice, Eva, and Herbert L. Petrie Claim, Southern Claims Commission No. 17, 128.

> Governor's Mansion; Demolished Telegraph wires torn down cut for several miles. Ladies robbed of jewelry and money.[74]

In response to this destruction, Jackson's citizens, like Mrs. Ida Barlow Trotter depicted Union troops as "blood thirsty men [who] have been playing havoc with both life and property in the Central part of the State." She claimed that these men "Had destroyed houses, gin houses, and anything that would burn" on their march to and from Jackson.[75] Fremantle's diary also reveals that Jackson residents were weary of any visitors to the city. For instance, when Fremantle arrived in full British uniform, Jackson residents momentarily detained and interrogated him.[76]

Edward Fontaine of Jackson wrote, "A victorious army of barbarians is now in less than 10 miles of me, & a gang of the covetous and blood thirsty scoundrels may be at my door at any moment."[77] Weeks later when recounting Sherman's activities in Jackson, Fontaine additionally conveyed extreme sadness towards the Yankees' capture of Jackson and their "destroying [of] our Railroads, factories, & public stores, ravaging the finest portion of the South, destroying thousands of plantations, carrying off stock of all sorts, with the poor slaves, & leaving their refined & wealthy owners homeless and ruined."[78] Rev. John Hunter from the First Presbyterian Church also recorded Union soldiers' actions when he exclaimed "Oh my God! Oh, the horrors if war with an enemy robbing and pillaging everywhere. . .Today they pillaged my house of many little and

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[74] Telegraph Dispatch, 16 May 1863, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi.

[75] "The Siege of Vicksburg and Some Personal Experiences Connected Therewith," Ida Barlow Trotter Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi.

[76] Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States*, 108.

[77] Bettersworth, "Edward Fontaine, Diary, 4-14 May 1863," *Mississippi in the Confederacy*, 117.

[78] Bettersworth, "Edward Fontaine, Diary, 29 May 1863," *Mississippi in the Confederacy,* 122.

valuable things. One of the robbers presented a pistol at me, but God was my defender."[79]

Dr. D. W. Yandell's recollections echo Fontaine's and Hunter's complaints about Sherman's men's activities. Yandell explained, "Jackson as the seat of government, probably received the worst going-over of any city in the state except Vicksburg. . .Jackson had its baptism of fire at short range and with careful deliberateness."[80] Yandell's emphasis on the deliberate nature of the soldiers' actions is significant. Earlier in the letter, Yandell contends that the Federal Army's sack of Jackson differed from that of Vicksburg, because Vicksburg burned due to "shelling," while Jackson burned "by torch."[81] President Jefferson Davis echoed this sentiment and recalled that most of the latter "laid in ashes."[82] Jackson residents estimated the damage at almost five million dollars.[83] Jackson's destruction did not result from conventional maneuvers but rather a new strategy – hard war.

Hard War in the Field

When Sherman returned to Jackson in July to "leave nothing of value for the enemy to carry on the war with," he repeated what he had done in May. In July, Sherman observed that "their Country is suffering the Scourge of War, and Peace or destruction seems their fate. This is a beautiful country, handsome dwellings and plantations, but the negroes are gone, houses vacant fields or corn open to the cattle, and our army has

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[79] Reverend John Hunter, 14 May 1863, Mississippi Department of Archives, Jackson, Mississippi.

[80] Bettersworth, "Letter from Dr. D.W. Yandell to John M. Johnson," *Mississippi in the Confederacy,* 202-203.

[81] Bettersworth, "Letter from Dr. D.W. Yandell to John M. Johnson," 202-203.

[82] Bettersworth, "Excerpt from Rowland, ed. *Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist*," *Mississippi in the Confederacy*, 204.

[83] "Interesting from the South."

consumed or is consuming all the cattle, hogs, sheep, chickens, turkies, and vegetables, Everything."[84]

In July, Sherman sent men North to destroy rail lines, he sent cavalry sixty miles South to wreak havoc, and kept four thousand men in Jackson to destroy railroads. He boasted, "Jackson will never again be a point where our enemy can assemble and threaten us on the river."[85] Sherman also exclaimed, "We are absolutely stripping the country of corn, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, everything. The wholesale destruction to which this country is now being subjected is terrible to contemplate, but it is the scourge of war."[86] Sherman then celebrated, "Jackson, once the pride and boast of Mississippi, is now a ruined town."[87] While the first quote seems like conventional strategy, Sherman's emphasis on his soldiers' destruction of "everything" illustrates that he was becoming more comfortable with hard war strategy.

Sherman's second and the more disastrous Jackson raid was clearly hard war. Historian Buckley T. Foster clarified that when Sherman transformed the city into "Chimneyville," he was neither directly threatened by the enemy nor in need of supplies when his men ransacked the city in July.[88] Rather, Sherman had Johnston on the run and many of the railroads remained in a state of disrepair, but as with Grant's earlier assault of Jackson, it was best to demolish the city than have it possibly aid the Confederates in the future. Moreover, the latter raid operated independent of conventional strategy, unlike the May raid. Nevertheless, to completely define hard war as occurring devoid of

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[84] Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, 15 July 1863. Proper punctuation added.
[85] Sherman to John Sherman, 19 July 1863.
[86] Sherman to Grant, 14 July 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 2: 526.
[87] Sherman to Porter, 19 July 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 531.
[88] Foster, *Sherman's Mississippi Campaign*; John K. Bettersworth, "Chimneyville," *Mississippi in the Confederacy: As They Saw It* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961), 202; H. Grady Howell Jr., *Chimneyville: "Likenesses" of Early Days in Jackson, Mississippi* (Madison, MS: Chickasaw Bayou Press, 2007).

conventional military reasons distorts the notion by creating a false dichotomy. In fact, Grant himself disclosed that there was no separation between the home front and battlefront, or Union policy towards Southern civilians and the Confederate military. Grant remarked that the ravaging of enemy supplies "tended to the same result as the destruction of armies."[89] Therefore, if one abandons this fictional dichotomy, the May 1863 raid was the workshop in which Grant and Sherman crafted hard war.

Sherman would continue large-scale devastation in Meridian. As with Jackson, Grant requested that Sherman wreck Meridian's rail junction.[90] Sherman contended that such a move, similar to its success in Jackson, would "paralyze" all of Mississippi and Mobile, Alabama.[91] Sherman aimed to "damage [the roads to Meridian] so that they could not be used again for hostile purposes during the rest of the war."[92] Sherman's troops capably demolished twenty miles of track in less than two days. Sherman also oversaw the burning, confiscating, or destruction of anything considered of military value or anything that could be easily converted to "hostile uses."[93] This included the Pioneer Manufacturing Cotton Mill, a small yarn mill, which started operations in Meridian in 1863.[94] As with the Jackson Pearl River Mills, a private individual owned this company and moved to Meridian because of its location on the railroad. Unfortunately, also similar to the Jackson factory, Sherman would burn the mill.[95]

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[89] Grant, *Memoirs*, 368-369.

[90] Robert C. Black, III, *The Railroads of the Confederacy* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1952), 240; Margie Riddle Bearrs, *Sherman's Forgotten Campaign: The Meridian Expedition* (Baltimore: Gateway Press, 1987), 4; Foster, *Sherman's Mississippi Campaign*, 16.

[91] Sherman to Rawlins, 14 October 1863, *OR,* vol. 30, pt. 4: 355-356.

[92] Grenville M. Dodge, *Personal Recollections of President Abraham Lincoln, General Ulysses S. Grant, General William T. Sherman* (Denver: Sage, 1965), 142-143; Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 363.

[93] Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 297.

[94] Foster, *Sherman's Mississippi Campaign*, 90.

[95] Foster, *Sherman's Mississippi Campaign*, 90-105.

Realizing his efficiency, as Sherman himself boasted at "cleaning out the State of Mississippi," he turned his attention towards Atlanta and beyond.[96] Sherman determined "to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources."[97] While marching through the heart of Georgia, Sherman would use tactics he and his troops had practiced during the Vicksburg campaign. He planned to sack Georgia's major cities while living off the land, exhaust General John Bell Hood's forces, burn Atlanta and the state capital, Milledgeville, and destroy the state's rail and telegraph lines.[98] Sherman's choice to wreck railroads noticeably mirrors his Mississippi operations.

Sherman's destruction of Columbia, South Carolina was the height of the hard war strategy. In Columbia, South Carolina, soldiers ransacked and burned military buildings and private homes. According to Historian Charles Royster, some South Carolinians claimed that Federal soldiers actively sought out specific homes and victims, especially of wealthy Columbians or ardent secessionists.[99] Royster further explains that the Federal's 1863 success in Mississippi "converted Sherman to the method of war he had been approaching," which he would use in Columbia.[100] Royster labels the entire campaign against Mississippi's Gibraltar between December 1862 and 4 July 1863 as the period in which Sherman adjusted his conception of warfare.[101]

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[96] Foster, *Sherman's Mississippi Campaign*, 16-17; Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 364.
[97] Grant to Sherman, 4 April 1865, *OR* vol. 32, pt. 3: 245-246.
[98] Joseph Glatthaar, *March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman's Troops in the Savannah and Carolinas Campaigns* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 5.
[99] Royster, *The Destructive War*, 20-21.
[100] Royster, *The Destructive War*, 115.
[101] Royster, *The Destructive War*, 110.

Conclusion

With the completed destruction of "all possibility of aid" from Jackson to Vicksburg on 14-15 May 1863, Grant and Sherman accepted hard war strategy and allowed their troops to confiscate both government and privately owned property, wreck miles of rail line, intimidate Southern whites, and forage from the countryside. The Army of the Tennessee's raid on Jackson began the gradual acceptance and use of hard war strategy in the American Civil War. After the Vicksburg campaign, Grant and Sherman would continue to implement hard war policies during Sherman's Meridian campaign and his destructive march through Georgia and the Carolinas. This change did not occur overnight, but over several weeks and for numerous reasons.

CHAPTER II

THE INLAND CAMPAIGN

The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on.
– Ulysses S. Grant[102]

Contemporary newspaperman Lloyd Lewis characterized the Mississippi River as "the spinal column of America."[103] President Abraham Lincoln also considered the river to be the Union's backbone, and with Admiral David G. Farragut's capture of New Orleans on 24 April 1862, Lincoln declared, "We can take all the northern ports of the Confederacy, and they can defy us from Vicksburg. It means hog and hominy without limit, fresh troops from all states of the far South, and a cotton country where they can raise the staple without interference."[104] Lincoln further insisted, "As valuable as New Orleans is to us, Vicksburg will be even more so."[105] Yet, in 1863, Vicksburg still dominated this lifeline and prevented Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter, approaching from the North, and Farragut in the South from pacifying the city. Therefore, pressured by Lincoln, Major General Ulysses S. Grant crafted a new strategy to conquer the city.

While Grant considered the capture and incapacitation of Jackson vital to his 1863 Vicksburg campaign, it was not the first step in his emergent hard war program. Rather, the Union's sixty-five mile march across the state's southeastern quadrant and Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson's raid through the state from La Grange, Tennessee to Baton

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[102] John Hill Brinton, *Personal Memoirs of John H. Brinton, Major and Surgeon U.S.V., 1861-1865* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1914), 239.

[103] Terrence J. Winschel, *Triumph and Defeat: The Vicksburg Campaign Vol. 2* (New York: Savas Beatie LLC, 2006), 74.

[104] David Dixon Porter, *Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1885), 95-96.

[105] Porter, *Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War*, 95-96. For more information see Terrence J. Winschel, "'The Key to Victory': An Overview of the Vicksburg Campaign," http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/gett/gettysburg_seminars/8/essay3.pdf (accessed 12 February 2012).

Rouge, Louisiana inaugurated the new strategy.[106] Grant's march to Jackson and Grierson's raid are both fundamental to the Union's early development of hard war strategy, and Union policy as a whole, in the American Civil War. The hard war approach Federal commanders began to embrace during Grant's Vicksburg campaign laid the foundation for his 1864 Overland campaign and Major General Philip H. Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley expedition. Moreover, an analysis of the Union's 1863 Vicksburg campaign will provide a greater understanding of the hard war strategy in 1864 and 1865.

Grant's Plan

"When it was demonstrated that nature and art had made Vicksburg impregnable from the river on its north side," Grant resolved to reach the city from the south.[107] Grant required three factors to invade Mississippi and move against the "Gibraltar of the Confederacy."[108] First, Porter of the United States Navy, commander of the Mississippi River Fleet, needed to run his fleet past Vicksburg's guns.[109] During the Civil War, the Confederate garrison at Vicksburg dominated the hairpin turn in the Mississippi River and their guns on the city's bluffs kept the U.S. Navy from moving past the city. Therefore, in mid-April Grant and Porter launched a joint operation to sneak past Vicksburg and transport troops into southwest Mississippi to capture the city from the rear.[110]

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[106] Moore, *The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom*, 167.
[107] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 555.
[108] Winschel, "'The Key to Victory"; Kevin J. Dougherty, *The Campaigns for Vicksburg, 1862-1863: Leadership Lessons* (Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2011).
[109] *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), Series I, vol. 24, 555.
[110] Dougherty, *The Campaigns for Vicksburg*, 21, 26-27; Grant, *Memoirs*, 236.

Porter's "running of the gauntlet" on the nights of 16 and 22 April provided Grant with fundamental river support, reliable transportation, and an indispensible diversion.[111] Grant hoped that Confederate Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton would respond to Porter's advance and artillery barrage by fortifying Vicksburg – which Pemberton did.[112] Additionally, Pemberton reinforced the city with troops from around the state, especially from the capital, in response to the surprise Union attack.[113] Pemberton's reallocation of troops weakened his Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana (D.M.E.L.) and provided Grant with sufficient time to march his three corps from northern Mississippi, through Louisiana at Milliken's Bend, and south to flank Vicksburg.

This operation was also dependent on Pemberton's reaction to a second factor – Sherman's maneuvers against Haynes' Bluff and Chickasaw Bayou. In response to the enemy reinforcing the Gulf, Grant instructed Sherman to make a feint above Vicksburg along the Yazoo River.[114] Sherman remarked later, "we aided much in passing the necessary fleet of boats below Vicksburg, and when the first battle was to begin at Grand Gulf we had the important but ungrateful task of deceiving out enemy by a feigned attack on Haynes' Bluff."[115] Grant intended the simulated attack to persuade Pemberton to further fortify the city while his Union troops moved into Mississippi.[116] Grant then

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[111] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 151-152; Grant, *Memoirs*, 250.

[112] Pemberton to Cooper, 17 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 751; Pemberton to Johnston, 17 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 751-752.

[113] Pemberton to Johnston, 17 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 751-753.

[114] McClernand to Grant, 26 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 234; O.H. Matz, "Map of the Country Between Milliken's Bend, LA and Jackson, Miss. showing the Routes followed by the Army of Tennessee Under the Command of Major General U.S. Grant. U.S. Volunteers. In its March from Milliken's Bend to the Rear of Vicksburg in April and May 1863, compiled, surveyed, and drawn under the Direction of Lt. Colonel James H. Wilson, A.I.G. and 1st Lt. Engineers" (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Engineers U.S. Army, 1876).

[115] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 555.

[116] McClernand to Grant, 26 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 234.

expected Sherman to form the left wing towards Jackson.[117] Fortunately, Sherman's April 1863 "feint or diversion was perfectly successful, and for weeks [he and his corps] succeeded admirably in confusing and deceiving the enemy as to [their] purposes, and contributed largely thereby in gaining a successful foothold on land below Vicksburg."[118]

Sherman's attack was so convincing that Pemberton believed Grant's river crossing was the trick and Sherman's was the real attack. For instance, Brigadier General John S. Bowen cautioned, "all the movements of the enemy during the last twenty-four hours [26-27 April] seem to indicate an intention on their part to march their army still lower down in Louisiana, perhaps to Saint Joseph, and then to run their steamers by me and cross to Rodney [Mississippi]."[119] However, Pemberton did not send troops south. As a result, he harmed his defense of the city. Bowen had miscalculated Grant's landing by only ten miles, and due to Pemberton's disregard, Grant's twenty-two thousand men crossed the river on 30 April without Confederate resistance.[120]

Along with Porter and Sherman's moves, Grant expected Major General Stephen A. Hurlbut and Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson to provide assistance. Although Grant left Hurlbut in Memphis to defend against Confederate cavalry, Grant had him plan a deep-penetration raid into Mississippi's center.[121] Grant believed that a large cavalry force would "ensure their success in reaching the road east of Jackson," and safeguard the

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[117] Special Orders No. 110, 20 April 1863, *OR,* vol. 24, pt. 3: 213.

[118] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 555.

[119] Bowen to Memminger, 27 April 1863, *OR,* vol. 24, pt. 3: 792-93; Christopher R. Gabel, "Battle Command Incompetencies: John C. Pemberton in the Vicksburg Campaign," *Studies in Battle Command.* Faculty Combat Studies Institute, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/resources/csi/battles/battles.asp#VII (accessed 24 January 2012).

[120] Grant to Halleck, 3 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 32; Gabel, "Battle Command Incompetencies."

[121] Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 112-113.

Vicksburg campaign.[122] Therefore, in March 1863, Grant ordered Hurlbut to prepare "the available cavalry put in as good condition as possible in the next few weeks for heavy service."[123] For his third measure, Grant ordered Grierson's 1,700-man cavalry raid to begin on 17 April.[124] Grierson's main column left La Grange, Tennessee towards Hazlehurst, Mississippi. Additionally, in an effort to confuse Pemberton, smaller parties dispersed in various directions.[125] Grant intended the raid not only to occupy Pemberton, but also to incapacitate the state, while his Union troops moved into southwestern Mississippi.

With Porter's naval assaults, Sherman's feint, and Grierson's raid, Pemberton thought everything was happening at once.[126]. Supposing that Grant was planning another offensive against the bluff city, Pemberton hastily reinforced Vicksburg.[127] Grant's ploys so disoriented Pemberton that when General Joseph E. Johnston requested Pemberton send more troops to Colonel Phillip Roddey, Pemberton not only refused, but also requested that Johnston send *him* troops to protect against Grant's attack.[128] After successfully confusing Pemberton, Grant crossed at Bruinsburg on 30 April 1863.[129]

Grant's Army

To be successful, Grant needed each of his corps commanders – Major General William Tecumseh Sherman's XV Corps, Major General James McPherson's XVII Corps, and, in the lead, Major General John A. McClernand's XIII Corps – to work as

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[122] Grant to Hurlbut, 9 March 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3:95.
[123] Grant to Hurlbut, 9 March 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3:95.
[124] Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days,* 113.
[125] Dougherty, *The Campaigns for Vicksburg*, 31.
[126] Pemberton to Davis, 18 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 760. Along with these grand measures, Union troops also attacked Greenville in the Mississippi Delta.
[127] Stevenson to Pemberton, 17 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 756-757.
[128] *OR*, vol. 24, pt.: 1: 253; Johnston to Pemberton, 18 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 760; Pemberton to Johnston, 20 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 769- 773; Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 112.
[129] Adams to Pemberton, 13 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 870.

one. Although Grant left Major General Stephen A. Hurlbut and the XVI Corps near Memphis to protect the vulnerable communication lines, Grant required him to contribute. But, success depended especially on the XIII and XVII corps.[130] Grant initially ordered McPherson and McClernand's divisions to scout the road to Jackson. However, with the arrival of Sherman's XV Corps on 7 May, Grant placed McClernand's XIII Corps farther south along the Big Black River, which was Pemberton's Army's main supply line. Grant intended this as a distraction and hoped that Pemberton would divide his Confederate forces further, which Pemberton did. Then, with their respective orders – McPherson's corps by the left via Clinton, Sherman by the right-hand road though Mississippi Springs, and McClernand's troops through Edward's Ferry at the center – Grant advanced on Jackson.[131]

Grant's Acceptance of Hard War

Grant's transition to hard war was a two-step process. The first step was Grant's choice to abandon his supply line from Grand Gulf to Jackson and live off the land until Union troops could locate another secure base.[132] Determined to retrieve adequate provisions, Grant allocated a substantial number of his men to locate provisions and supplies along the Big Black River. Secondly, Grant ordered troops to destroy the public property in Mississippi's capital.[133] These steps began the evolution of the Union's emerging hard war program, discouraged Southern civilians loyal to the Confederacy, and weakened Mississippi's economy, all in fifteen days.

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[130] *OR*, vol.1: 46; Grant, *Memoirs*, 262; Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 60.
[131] Grant, *Memoirs*, 234, 254; Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 296-297.
[132] Grant, *Memoirs*, 262.
[133] Grant to Sherman, 14 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 312.

For Grant's offensive, Union soldiers needed to move swiftly across Mississippi, divide Pemberton's forces, and sack Jackson before the Confederate garrison removed their materials to safety. This required either a long supply line from Grand Gulf to Jackson or no supply line at all. The former demanded constant protection from Confederate raiders, because an attack could have ruined the entire campaign.[134] Grant had already learned this lesson in December of 1862, when Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest's raiders and Major General Earl Van Dorn's cavalry struck his supply lines. This devastating attack, in which Van Dorn burned $1,500,000 worth of stores, forced Grant to forage until his lines could be repaired.[135] Learning from this experience, Grant observed, "[Van Dorn's raid] demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining so long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy's country."[136] One historian argued that Forrest and Van Dorn's raids made Grant knowledgeable of foraging's benefits, which he implemented during his 1863 Inland campaign.[137]

This threat, compounded with his inability to spare troops for guard duty and the Federal government's growing acceptance of hard war with General Order No. 100, persuaded Grant to embrace hard war and abandon his supply lines. Initially, Grant aimed to use Grand Gulf, Mississippi as a base since it was on the main road to Jackson. However, Grant was still approximately sixty miles from the capital and companies

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[134] Grant, *Memoirs*, 232-233; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War,* 101.
[135] Van Dorn to Pemberton, 20 December 1862, *OR*, vol. 17, pt. 1: 303.
[136] Grant, *Memoirs*, 229.
[137] Dougherty, *The Campaigns for Vicksburg*, 29.

constantly running along a supply line possibly jeopardized the campaign.[138] Therefore, Grant abandoned the town and embraced early hard war strategy.[139]

Major General Halleck in Washington, as well as Sherman, initially cautioned against Grant's decision to abandon Grand Gulf as a base. In spite of General Order No. 100's obscure language, the government still did not officially condone mass foraging and Halleck believed that the land could not sustain thirty-three thousand men. Grant understood their apprehension, but seeing foraging's success in 1862 and out of necessity he had his troops "get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance."[140]

The Inland campaign was not the first time Grant contemplated mass pillaging. In October 1862, he asked Sherman about the possibility of launching raids on Confederate property, such as farms, plantations, railroads, and factories. Sherman responded, "We cannot change the hearts of those people in the South, but we can make war so terrible that they will realize the fact that however brave and gallant and devoted to their country, still they are mortal and should exhaust all peaceful remedies before they fly to war."[141] During this time, Sherman was beginning to shape his hard war strategy in response to his growing frustration with guerrilla attacks. While in Memphis, for instance, Sherman remarked, "The Government of the United States may now safely proceed on the proper Rule that all in the South are Enemies of all in the North" and "as to changing the opinions of the People of the South that is impossible, and they must be killed or

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[138] Grant, *Memoirs*, 258-259.
[139] McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom,* 629.
[140] Grant, *Memoirs*, 261-262.
[141] Sherman to Grant, 4 October 1862, *OR* vol. 17, pt. 2: 261, quoted in Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 118.

dispossessed."[142] Sherman added, "We have finished the first page of this war in vainly seeking a union sentiment in the South. . . and are about Entering on a Second period. Those who sought political advantage by a display of military Zeal have disappeared from the Field of action, and now will begin the real struggle of conquest. Negro property and personal property are fair subjects of conquest, as also the possession of Real Estate during the lives of present owners."[143] Although, neither Sherman nor Grant *encouraged* mass foraging in 1862, their understanding of conventional military strategy began to shift in 1863. They would first embrace the new strategy of hard war during the Vicksburg campaign.

Grant's Offensive

During his Inland campaign Grant expected all of his men to forage. Grant needed to feed and supply his troops without delay – a delay would only give the enemy time to reinforce, fortify, and prepare – he did not have that option. Union officers sent official detachments to plantations along the Big Black River to confiscate wagons, draft animals, and other livestock. While foraging Federal troops also implemented a denial policy, which meant that if they could not completely use or transport all the stores, they destroyed them. Grant hoped these actions would cripple Confederate morale.[144]

During their march Federal soldiers ravaged many homes and farms for supplies. Mississippians reported the loss of thousands of dollars worth of goods.[145] For instance, one plantation owner recorded that Grant's Army, specifically the soldiers from Illinois

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[142] Sherman to Salmon P. Chase, 11 August 1862, Brooks D. Simpson and Jean V. Berlin, *Sherman's Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William T. Sherman, 1860-1865* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 269; Sherman to Thomas Ewing Sherman, 10 August 1862, *Sherman's Civil War,* 263.

[143] Sherman to Thomas Ewing Sherman, 10 August 1862, *Sherman's Civil War,* 263-264.

[144] Grant, *Memoirs*, 261.

[145] Grant, *Memoirs*, 262.

and Ohio, confiscated $29,855.00 in property on 4 May 1863 alone. In this one day, soldiers took loads of corn, bacon, fodder, lumber, fence rails, wagon gears, and the plantation wagon. Along with these foodstuffs, soldiers took fifteen mules, two horses, forty sheep, fifteen milk cows, twenty-five cattle, ten oxen, and one hundred hogs.

Additionally, Union soldiers allegedly confiscated all the available cotton on the property. The owner's claim illustrates that the soldiers must have thoroughly searched for cotton, because they took cotton from "under" and "in the gin," from the old seed house, and the fodder house. Along with taking these 120 bales of cotton, soldiers also burned fifteen bales found in a bin rather than leave it to the civilians or the Confederate military. Union troops took or attempted to burn everything available, and the owner was only able to save forty bales of cotton from the fire.[146] While it seemed as if this plantation prospered before the Union Army's arrival, Union troops clearly left it destitute with Grant's decision to abandon his supply line and have his men forage for provisions.

For instance, Grant's 1863 warning against the "wanton destruction of property, taking of articles, unless for military purposes, insulting citizens, [and] going into and searching houses without proper orders from division commanders" includes the clause "without proper orders."[147] The added clause indicates that as long as Union officers follow protocol, they could order the destruction of private property. For example, with

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[146] "List of Stock and Property Taken by Grant's Army from an Unidentified Mississippi Plantation, 1863," State Government Records, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi.

[147] Special Orders No.110, 20 April 1863, *OR,* 3: 213.

Grant's permission, Brigadier General Frederick Steele ordered the sacking of Deer Creek, Mississippi in April 1863 in response to an increase in guerilla activities.[148]

According to Sherman, guerillas considered Greenville to be a "favorite point in which to assail our boats."[149] Therefore, Grant and Sherman directed Steele to "let the planters and inhabitants on Deer Creek see and feel that they will be held accountable for the acts of guerillas and Confederate soldiers who sojourn in their country."[150] Additionally, "If planters remain at home and behave themselves, molest them as little as possible, but if the planters abandon their plantations, you may infer they are hostile, and can take their cattle, hogs, corn, and anything you need."[151] Sherman further noted, "All provisions which are needed by us or might be used by the army in Vicksburg, unless needed by the peaceful inhabitants, should be brought away, used by your men, or destroyed."[152]

On 11 April, Grant additionally informed Steele, "Rebellion has assumed that shape now that it can only terminate by the complete subjugation of the South or the overthrow of the Government. . .it is our duty therefore to use every means to weaken the enemy be destroying their means of cultivating their field, and in every other way possible."[153] Accordingly, Steele confiscated "thousand head of stock, horses, mules and beef cattle. . .a number of ox, wagons, carts, buggies, &c."[154] Steele also celebrated that his men burned everything there was to eat on the plantations and his officers estimated that his troops burned five hundred thousand bushels of corn, and that at least twenty-five

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[148] Special Orders No.110, 20 April 1863, *OR,* vol. 24, pt. 3: 213; Ballard, *Vicksburg*, 210-211.
[149] Sherman to Steele, 31 March 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 158.
[150] Sherman to Steele, 31 March 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 158.
[151] Sherman to Steele, 31 March 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 158.
[152] Sherman to Steele, 31 March 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 158; Dougherty, *The Campaigns for Vicksburg.*
[153] Grant to Steele, 11 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 186-187.
[154] Steele to Grant, 10 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 501-502.

thousand of those were destined for Vicksburg. Along with hitting the Thompsons' plantation, Steele also attacked the Frenches' plantation and burned several bridges.[155] An Illinois chaplain praised Steele when he saw the "charred remains of the once pleasant little village. . .This is the point where the guerrillas have been committing depredations for sometime past."[156] The town's destruction signifies the Union's acceptance of hard war within a structured strategy as the Union's General Order No. 100 introduced.

For example, in late April 1863 Major General McPherson limited foraging to sanctioned parties only after he saw soldiers shattering private furniture not for firewood, but to simply terrorize a family during the Inland campaign.[157] Similarly, Sherman considered the useless destruction of private property, such as portraits, unjustifiable in warfare.[158] Sherman, like McPherson, thought that needless raiding harmed the troops' morals. Nonetheless, Sherman did not seem too vexed about such actions and after witnessing such destruction he briefly commented, "I fear the house & contents will be burned by the stragglers of my corps, but we are moving in the wrong direction to save anything."[159] Therefore, by spring 1863 Union officers began to disregard their soldiers' raids of unoccupied homes, the homes of hostile civilians, and to destroy or confiscate enemy property.

For instance, on 6 May 1863 Sherman admitted, "Of course I expect & do take corn, bacon, horses, mules, and everything to support an army, and dont [sic] object

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[155] Steele to Grant, 10 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 501-502.

[156] N.B. Baker Diary, 24 May 1863, 116th Illinois File, Vicksburg National Military Park, Vicksburg, Mississippi.

[157] John Q. A. Campbell Diary, 30 April 1863, J.Q.A. Campbell Diaries, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio, quoted in Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 155.

[158] Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, 6 May 1863.

[159] Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, 6 May 1863.

much to the using fences for firewood."[160] Confederate soldiers and Southern guerillas could have benefitted from these items if not confiscated or destroyed. Therefore, Sherman considered these actions justifiable in warfare and would continue to implement them in 1864 and 1865. For instance in 1864, Sherman declared, "When men take up arms to resist a rightful authority, we are compelled to use like force. . .When the provisions, forage, horses, mules, wagons, etc., are used by our enemy, it is clearly our duty and right to take them also, because otherwise they might be used against us. In like manner all houses left vacant by an inimical people are clearly our right, and as such are needed as storehouses, hospitals, and quarters."[161]

Doomed to Fail

Due to his diversions, Grant's march into Mississippi was relatively easy. Although Pemberton had upwards of fifty thousand men, these troops were not easily assembled or, as military historian Christopher Gabel argues, "led decisively."[162] In fact, as a result of the Union Army's multiple schemes, Pemberton spread his troops so haphazardly that at the Battle of Jackson only six thousand Confederate troops were in the city.[163] To make matters worse, when Pemberton heard of Grant's incursion, Jackson's fortifications remained unfinished and reinforcements were days away.[164]

Along with ignoring his subordinates' warnings – Pemberton had already disregarded Brigadier General John S. Bowen's warnings that Grant had crossed the river – Pemberton was slow to adjust. In spite of frequent reports of Grant's assault against

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[160] Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, 6 May 1863.

[161] Rachel Sherman Thorndike, ed., *The Sherman Letters: Correspondence between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894), 228-30.

[162] Gabel, "Battle Command Incompetencies."

[163] A.P. Mason Report, 24 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24 pt. 3: 876.

[164] Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 244.

Grand Gulf on 29 April, Pemberton failed to send reinforcements to confront Grant. When Pemberton finally left his Jackson headquarters on 1 May, he did not advance south towards Grant, but rather west towards Vicksburg. Due to Pemberton's poor choices, Union forces at Port Gibson outnumbered Bowen's forces three to one.[165] Furthermore, most of the state's troopers remained scattered across the northern part of the state. Consequently, Pemberton's choice to abandon Jackson endangered the capital, trapped his troops in Vicksburg, and resulted in the city's surrender on 4 July 1863.

Grierson's Raid

Grant's Inland campaign also acted as a rehearsal for his 1864 Overland campaign in the Eastern Theater.[166] Historians recognize the latter as a relentless campaign to defeat the Army of Northern Virginia and to take Richmond. However, 1864 was not the first time Grant waged this type of warfare. Rather, his later Overland campaign resembles his earlier push for Vicksburg. For example, a main asset of his 1864 campaign was Major General Philip H. Sheridan's destruction of the Shenandoah Valley. This later operation echoes Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson's raid through Mississippi as part of Grant's 1863 Vicksburg campaign, which was a fundamental step in the strategy of hard war's evolution.

Realizing that he required multiple plans to take Vicksburg, on 13 February 1863 Grant declared, "It seems to me that Grierson with about 500 picked men, might succeed…The undertaking would be a hazardous one, but would pay well if carried out. I do not direct that shall be done, but leave it for a volunteer enterprise."[167] Grant determined this undertaking to sidetrack Pemberton and Van Dorn from the Mississippi

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[165] Gabel, "Battle Command Incompetencies."
[166] Ballard, *Vicksburg.*
[167] Grant to Hurlbut, 3 February 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 49-50.

Central Railroad. Therefore, on 10 April Grant informed Hurlbut to "strike out by way of Pontotoc, breaking right and left, cutting both roads, destroying the wires, burning provisions, and doing all the mischief they can, while one regiment ranges straight down to Selma or Meridian, breaking the east and west road thoroughly, and swinging back through Alabama."[168] Believing Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson to be the best officer for the job, Hurlbut sent him a telegraph on 13 April, "Return Immediately."[169]

Although Grierson knew that neither Grant nor Hurlbut told him the whole plan, he recognized that his order was important to the Vicksburg campaign. [170] Grant understood that cutting the railroads would distract Pemberton and provide Grant with enough time to launch his grand offensive. Grant expected Grierson "to destroy railroads and other public property, for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of the army moving to the attack on Vicksburg."[171] Consequently, Grierson's success would determine Union strategy in the Western Theater.[172]

Grierson boarded the train from Memphis to La Grange on 16 April and wrote to his wife, "My command is ordered to leave. . .you must not be alarmed should you not hear from me inside a month. "[173] After discussing his plan with General William Sooy Smith, Grierson issued orders for "light rations" to his brigade and on 17 April, Grierson led 1,700 men from La Grange towards the his main objectives – the Mobile and Ohio

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[168] Hurlbut to Smith, 10 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 185.

[169] Benjamin Henry Grierson, Bruce J. Dinges and Shirley A. Leckie, ed., *A Just and Righteous Cause: Benjamin H. Grierson's Civil War Memoir* (Carbondale, IL Southern Illinois University, 2008), 144-146.

[170] Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 112-113.

[171] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 58.

[172] Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 113.

[173] William H. Leckie and Shirley A. Leckie, *Unlikely Warriors; General Benjamin Grierson and His Family* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984).

and Mississippi Central railroads.[174] Shortly after Grierson's departure, Hurlbut launched several smaller raids to detract attention from Grierson's party, so that the latter could hit the railroads quickly.[175]

For instance, before Grierson reached New Albany on the 18 April, Hurlbut had four other missions underway.[176] Brigadier General Sooy Smith and his fifteen hundred men marched southwest from La Grange, while five thousand men from Corinth marched east toward Tuscumbia.[177] Another force of thirteen hundred marched towards Panola, Mississippi to confront Confederate Brigadier General James Chalmers' forces, while Colonel Abel Streight launched his raid into Alabama.[178] All of these supporting expeditions served their purpose and Grierson's command met no opposition on the first day and traveled thirty miles to Ripley, Mississippi.[179]

Grierson's success continued and on 19 April, he attacked Pontotoc, Mississippi.[180] Here, Grierson's men employed hard war strategy and captured a large mill, about four hundred bushels of salt and camp equipage, books, and papers.[181] Along with Grierson's hard war achievements, Colonel Edward Hatch also made headways through Mississippi. For instance, on 20 April, Hatch cut the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at West Point.[182] Along with wrecking the rail lines, Grierson also instructed Hatch to destroy "all public property as far South as possible…if practicable, take Columbus and

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[174] Hurlbut to Rawlins, 17 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 202. For more information see Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days,* 112.

[175] Hurlbut to Rawlins, 17 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 202.

[176] Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days,* 107-112.

[177] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 521; Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 108-109.

[178] Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days*, 104-105, 107-109.

[179] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 529.

[180] Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 522-523. See also Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days,* 113.

[181] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 523.

[182] Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 523; Ruggles to Pemberton, 20 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 771; Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days.* 114.

destroy all Government works."[183] After causing significant devastation, Hatch's men unfortunately encountered Confederate Lieutenant Colonel C.R. Barteau's cavalrymen at Palo Alto, Mississippi and retreated northward.[184] During his retreat, though, Hatch continued to implement the early hard war strategy and destroyed a large amount of provisions at Okolona and Tupelo.[185] As a supporting role to Grierson's overall raid, Hatch was quite effective in destroying both military and non-military items.[186]

Even with the Union's raids into enemy territory, Pemberton still regarded this action to be "a mere raid," and did not send a large force to intercept them.[187] The *Daily Mississippian* commented on Pemberton's negligence, "We have information that the enemy entered Brookhaven yesterday evening, burnt the railroad depot, cut the wires, and after doing what other damage they pleased, leisurely retired (a portion of them at least) in an easterly direction."[188]

Since Hatch preoccupied Barteau in the state's northern sector and Pemberton remained unconvinced, Grierson was able to launch a devastating push towards Starkville, Mississippi on 22 April, where he burned all of the town's government property.[189] After Starkville, Grierson detached Major John Graham's battalion to Bankston, Mississippi to destroy a large tannery and shoe factory on 26 April.[190] As with Grierson's own success, Graham captured a Confederate quartermaster and machinery.

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[183] Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 523.

[184] Pemberton to Reynolds, 27 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 794; Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days,* 120.

[185] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 555. Hatch safely retuned to La Grange on 26 April.

[186] Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days,* 114.

[187] Pemberton to Ruggles, 20 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 770; Hurlbut to Rawlins, 20 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 214-215.

[188] *Daily Mississippian,* 30 April 1863.

[189] Pemberton to Johnston, 22 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 776; Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 523.

[190] Ruggles to Loring, 26 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 791; Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 522.

Additionally, the Union cavalrymen captured $50,000 worth of shoes, boots, leather, saddles, and bridles for Vicksburg and Port Gibson's Confederate garrisons.[191]

Along with Hatch and Graham, Grierson detached another small force to strike the railroad at Macon, Mississippi.[192] While Captain Henry Forbes led this separate operation, Grierson advanced on the Southern Mississippi Railroad at Newton Station via Louisville.[193] Although Grierson had implemented destructive warfare throughout his entire raid up to this point, here Grierson issued strict orders to "drive out stragglers, preserve order, and quiet the fears of the people."[194] Most likely to the residents' relief, the Federal cavalrymen passed through the town without incident.

Grierson considered Newton Station his primary objective.[195] Here, he destroyed two locomotives, twenty-five freight cars loaded with commissary stores and ammunition, including artillery shells bound for Vicksburg, additional stores and five hundred muskets.[196] Along with these military items, Edward Fontaine of Jackson declared, "They have cut the telegraph at Lake in Newton Co. & burnt Newton Station. Nothing proves more fully the incompetency of our Generals than the miserable disposition of the forces appointed to defend the State. This raid is the most successful the Yankees have yet made, and is a disgrace to our State. Nothing that I can discover interferes with their taking the city of Jackson."[197] When Grierson learned that

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[191] Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 523.
[192] Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 523.
[193] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 520.
[194] Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 524.
[195] Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 526.
[196] "Colonel Grierson's Raid," *Harper's Weekly*, 6 June 1863, 358; Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 526; Pemberton to Chalmers, 26 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 790; Grierson, *A Just and Righteous Cause,* 158.
[197] Edward Fontaine, Diary, April 23-25, 1863.

Pemberton was busy reinforcing Jackson and points eastward, he moved southwest to hit the New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern Railroad at Hazlehurst.[198]

When news reached Jackson that "a large Yankee force of cavalry 2, or 3,000 strong have swept down the country as far as Lodi in Choctaw County west of Columbus," Pemberton diverted a division's worth of men to intercept the Union raiders.[199] This act further weakened Pemberton's already scattered forces and his choice to detach several of Bowen's companies only made matters worse. Even with Pemberton's attempt to hinder the Federal raid, on 26 April Grierson continued to Raleigh across the Leaf River, where his men captured the county sheriff and confiscated $3,000 in Confederate government funds.[200] Then, Grierson headed for Hazlehurst, where he attacked the railroad, burned a string of boxcars, and most of the town.[201] While Grierson was mostly targeting military items, his nonchalant response to pillaging and private property destruction, similar to Grant's and Sherman's response one month later in Jackson, demonstrate that Union commanders were gradually accepting hard war strategy as an alternative way to subdue the Confederacy.

When Pemberton heard of Hazlehurst, he commented, "All the cavalry I can raise is close on their rear," and instructed Colonel Wirt Adam's cavalry to capture the Yankee cavalry.[202] Considering the possibility of being overwhelmed by Confederates, Grierson headed towards Baton Rouge. With the Confederates in pursuit, Grierson ordered Colonel Reuben Loomis to head westward toward Fayette and then to Brookhaven. Although temporarily fooled by Loomis' feint toward Fayette, Adams and Colonel R. V.

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[198] Pemberton to Johnston, 27 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 791.
[199] Edward Fontaine, Diary, April 23-25, 1863; *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 254.
[200] Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 526.
[201] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 520.
[202] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 255; Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 526; Leckie, *Unlikely Warriors.*

Richardson's cavalry were gaining on Brookhaven – where Grierson burned the depot and several freight cars.[203] Yet, even with this constant threat, Hurlbut assured Rawlins, "I have no doubt of Grierson's success."[204] The *Jackson Appeal* echoed Hurlbut's prediction and reported on 28 April, "The penetration of an enemy's country however, so extensively, will be recorded as one of the greatest feats of the war, no matter whether the actors escaped or were captured."[205]

On 30 April, Grierson resumed his destruction. At Bogue Chitto Station, Mississippi, for example, he burned fifteen freight cars and the depot. He destroyed an additional twenty-five freight cars and a large store of government sugar at Summit, Mississippi. Yet, with Confederate resistance building, Grierson decided to take the road to Baton Rouge on 1 May, and just sixteen days after he left La Grange, Grierson led his troopers into the city.[206]

According to Hurlbut, "our gallant soldier Grierson proceeded with his command unchallenged, and has splendidly performed the duty he was sent upon."[207] Grierson himself claimed to have killed and wounded one hundred Confederates, captured five hundred, destroyed between fifty and sixty miles of railroad, destroyed over three thousand arms, captured one thousand horses and mules, and covered six hundred miles, all in sixteen days.[208] Along with these items, *Harper's Weekly* estimated that Grierson also destroyed four million dollars worth of stores and property.[209] At Sandy Creek alone, Grierson destroyed and captured fifty tents, "a large quantity of ammunition, guns,

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[203] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 254-255; Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days,* 121.
[204] Hurlbut to Rawlins, 27 April 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 237.
[205] Reprinted in *New York Times,* 10 May 1863.
[206] Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 527-528; Grant to Halleck, 3 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 33; Grabau, *Ninety-eight Days,* 122.
[207] Hurlbut to Rawlins, 5 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 276.
[208] Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 528.
[209] "Colonel Grierson's Raid," 358.

public and private stores, books, papers, and public documents."[210] Similar to his capture of Pontotoc, Grierson's choice to destroy both public and private property illustrates hard war's development in 1863.

Grant celebrated Grierson's achievement with "Colonel Grierson's raid from La Grange through Mississippi has been the most successful thing of the kind since the breaking out of the rebellion." Even Southerners referred to it as "one of the most daring exploits of the war."[211] Grierson himself recalled, "no one can pass through that country without knowing that the Confederacy is broken up. It is a mere shell with nothing in it."[212] Bolstering Grierson's claims of success, one of Grant's informants exclaimed, "Grierson has knocked the heart out of the State."[213] But nothing sums up Grierson's success more than Jackson's own *Daily Mississippian* in this article from 30 April 1863:

> Well, well! We are free to admit that Mr. (we beg his pardon) Colonel Grierson and his boys have had a "good time of it" for the last week. It is actually amusing to think (although, we confess, annoying) how they have roved around, within forty or fifty miles of the capitol of the State – eating fried ham and eggs and broiled spring chickens every morning for breakfast, at the expense of the planters whom they choose to honor with a visit – luxuriating on fat mutton, green peas and (of course) strawberries and cream for dinner – and all this without caring for the terrible fact (confound their impudence) that they were within a few hours ride of Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton's headquarters, or thinking for an instant that the commander-in-chief of the "State Troops" lived, moved, breathed and had his being in the city of Jackson. It is actually provoking to think how Colonel (we mean Brigadier General – begging his pardon) Grierson and his jolly riders have enjoyed themselves for a whole week. . . We hope Maj. Gen Grierson (we have a penchant for long military titles) will not take off the wires of the telegraph as he proceeds – for, as it seems he can't be caught or headed off, we feel some curiosity to be regularly informed of his where abouts.[214]

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[210] Grierson to Rawlins, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 528.
[211] Grant to Halleck, 3 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 33-34.
[212] "The Romance of War," *New York Times,* 18 May 1863.
[213] Grant to Halleck, 6 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 34.
[214] *Daily Mississippian,* 30 April 1863.

Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley Campaign

As Grant used Grierson to aid his Inland campaign, Grant would also order Major General Philip H. Sheridan to deny General Robert E. Lee supplies and reinforcements during his 1864 Overland campaign. Believing the Army of the Potomac's failures extended from their inability to work with other Northern armies, Grant coordinated the two Federal armies towards one goal – denying Confederate armies support and supplies.[215] Grant expected the two periphery armies – Benjamin Butler's Army of the James and Franz Sigel's forces in West Virginia, – to support Grant and Major General George S. Meade's operations in Virginia.

Grant demanded Sigel and Butler to cut Lee's supply and communication lines. By denying the Army of Northern Virginia valuable supplies Grant incorporated strategy he first began in Mississippi. Grant hoped that these armies would accomplish what he had in Mississippi. However, both Butler and Sigel failed. In response, Grant ordered Major General Philip H. Sheridan to devastate the Shenandoah Valley.

On 6 August 1864, Lincoln promoted Sheridan to commander of the newly created Army of the Shenandoah – composed of two divisions from Louisiana and two divisions from Sheridan's own cavalry. Frustrated with Sheridan's predecessors' performances, Grant ordered him to go after Lieutenant General Jubal Early, "follow him to the Death," and then turn "the Shenandoah Valley [into] a barren waste. . .so that crows flying over it for the balance of this season will have to carry their provender with

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[215] McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom*, 722.

them."[216] Union soldiers had already destroyed a great deal more than military property, which did not seem to bother Grant, and Sheridan's raids were far more devastating.[217]

By 7 October 1864 Sheridan reported that his troops had "destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over seventy mills filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4,000 head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than 3,000 sheep."[218] Proud of their success, some of Sheridan's soldiers described themselves as "barn burners" and "destroyers of homes."[219] With this expedition, Union troops took the war directly to the Southern women and children.

Attrition

Besides raiding private homes, Grant's Eastern Theater operations mirror his smaller Mississippi campaign in maneuver. For example, his push for Vicksburg involved five battles in quick succession – Port Gibson (1 May), Raymond (12 May), Jackson (14 May), Champion Hill (16 May), and Big Black River (17 May) – and concluded with the Vicksburg siege. Likewise, his 1864 Overland campaign included four battles – The Wilderness (5-7 May), Spotsylvania Court House (8-21 May), North Anna River (23-26 May), and Cold Harbor (31 May-12 June) – and ended with the Petersburg siege.[220] While this may seem coincidental, it is not the number of battles that is remarkable but the intervals between them.

As historian Joan Waugh reveals, armies adopted cultural traits. The Army of the Tennessee, especially with Grant's 1862 victories at Forts Henry and Donelson,

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[216] McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom*, 758, 778.
[217] McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom*, 737-739.
[218] McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom,* 778.
[219] Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 183.
[220] McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom*, 733.

developed an "aggressive…'can-do' attitude," while the Army of the Potomac was timid and cautious.[221] Before Grant's arrival in the East, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia took extended breaks between large engagements. However, with Grant's promotion to Lieutenant General and his arrival in the East, he would force the Army of the Potomac to maintain the offensive.

For example, after the bloody 1864 Battle of the Wilderness, Grant did not retreat, but instead moved southeast to flank Lee. This drive mirrors Major General McPherson's 1863 movement towards Jackson in spite of his engagement at Raymond. There was no time to be lost in recovering. The Battle of Raymond occurred on 11 May 1863, three days before the Battle of Jackson, and although McPherson suffered approximately four hundred casualties at Raymond, he moved quickly into the city before Gregg and Johnston could reinforce.[222] Between 1 May and 17 July 1863, Grant launched an impressive overland operation that weakened Mississippi's interior, demoralized civilians, and resulted with Pemberton's surrender of Vicksburg in 4 July 1863. Learning from this, Grant would apply similar destructive and attritional strategy in Virginia.

Grant instructed Sherman to destroy Jackson quickly because to leave it untouched risked the operation and Grant could not fail again. Grant also needed to move rapidly across the interior to cut Vicksburg off from the rest of the state. Accordingly, after the battles of Raymond and Jackson, Grant's army quickly hit Pemberton's forces at Champion Hill (16 May) and Big Black River (17 May).[223] Grant lost 7,200 men in comparison to a Confederate loss of 4,300 men in seventeen days.

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[221] Waugh, *U.S. Grant*, 76.
[222] Grant to Halleck, 14 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 36; Grant, *Memoirs*, 264.
[223] Dougherty, *The Campaigns for Vicksburg.*

Recognizing Grant's latest strategy and its success while standing on Vicksburg's heights, Sherman complimented "I could never see the ending until now. But this is a campaign. This is a success if we never take the town."[224]

Building from his 1863 Mississippi experience, in May 1864 Grant informed Meade "Lee's Army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, here you will go also."[225] The first step in this plan was to surround Lee's forces at the Wilderness (5-7 May) and push towards Richmond. Although Grant suffered 17,500 casualties, he quickly regrouped and hit Lee a second time at Spotsylvania Court House (8-21 May).[226] This limited recess between engagements was one of Grant's signatures that he cultivated in 1863. From his Mississippi victories and his earlier triumphs at Fort Donelson and Fort Henry he learned to never let the enemy rest and reinforce. For instance, in 1862 Grant remarked, "The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on."[227] According to this strategy, although the press nicknamed him the "butcher," Grant would implement attritional warfare in Virginia.[228]

After the bloody battles at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, even though Grant lost thirty-two thousand men in eight days, he ordered the infamous frontal assaults at Cold Harbor. In the four weeks between the Wilderness and Petersburg, the Federals suffered forty-four thousand casualties while the Confederates sustained some twenty-five thousand.[229] Although the Overland campaign would stalemate outside Petersburg,

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[224] McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom,* 631.
[225] Waugh, *U.S. Grant*, 83.
[226] McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom,* 726-730.
[227] Brinton, *Personal Memoirs*, 239.
[228] Rafuse, "Still A Mystery?" 850-851; William S. McFeely, *Grant: A Biography* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981).
[229] McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom,* 732-733.

Grant's "new kind of relentless, ceaseless warfare" that he practiced in the West contributed to the enemy's surrender at Appomattox in April 1865.[230] While these are broad comparisons, there are clear parallels between the two theaters that scholars cannot ignore if they want to understand hard war during the Civil War.

Conclusion

With Porter, Sherman, and Grierson's diversions, and Grant's impressive march through Mississippi's southeastern quadrant, the Union Army "swept the enemy before [them] to Jackson and back again to Vicksburg, reaching, after unexampled skill, the very points [they] aimed to secure in December."[231] With these operations, along with Sherman's subsequent destruction of Jackson on 15 May, the Union began embracing hard war strategy.[232] The destruction Grant and Sherman allowed during the 1863 Vicksburg campaign laid the foundation for his 1864 Overland campaign and Major General Philip H. Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley expedition, in which Union commanders brought the devastating reality of war to Southern civilians.

Grant's Vicksburg campaign also paralleled Sherman's swath through Georgia and the Carolinas. In 1863, Grant permitted his troops to confiscate supplies and animals that possibly aided the Confederacy. Additionally, Grant and his commanders did not punish the theft of personal items. Although this was innovative for the Federal Army in 1863, it would become typical later in the war. Another action that would become commonplace in 1864 and 1865 was the Union's harassment of Southern women, the raiding of private residences, and the theft of personal belongings, such as jewelry,

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[230] McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom,* 732-733.
[231] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 555.
[232] Moore, *The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom*, 167.

clothing, and furniture. The following case study explores Sherman's consent of such in Mississippi and his later more infamous campaigns.

CHAPTER III

BATTLES ON THE HOME FRONT

They are as much governed by the rules of war as if in the ranks.
– William. T. Sherman[233]

During his Atlanta campaign, William T. Sherman ordered the deportation of Southern women and children from Roswell Factory, Georgia. Union Brigadier General Kenner Garrard had already burned the town's factory on 6 July 1864, because it supplied the Confederacy with cloth initially "reserved for use of United States hospitals."[234] Garrard explained, "Over the woolen factory the French flag was flying, but seeing no Federal flag above it I had the building burnt. All are burnt. The cotton factory was worked up to the time of its destruction, some 400 women, being employed."[235]

Sherman complimented Garrard's prompt actions and declared, "arrest the owners and employee[s] and send them, under guard, charged with treason, to Marietta, and I will see as to any man in America hoisting the French flag and then devoting his labor and capital in supplying armies in open hostility to our Government. . .Should you, under the impulse of anger, natural at contemplating such perfidy, hang the wretch, I approve the act before hand."[236] Sherman later added, "I repeat my orders that you arrest all people, male and female, connected with those factories, no matter what the clamor and let them foot it. . .The poor women will make a howl. Let them take their children and clothing, provided they have the means of hauling or you can spare them. We will retain

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[233] *OR*, vol. 38, pt. 5: 73.
[234] *OR*, vol. 38, pt. 5: 73.
[235] *OR*, vol. 38, pt. 5: 68.
[236] *OR*, vol. 38, pt. 5: 76.

them until they can reach a country where they can live in peace and security."[237]

On 7 July, Sherman informed Major General Henry W. Halleck that the factories had aided the Confederacy for years, and therefore, his troops justifiably destroyed them. Sherman emphasized that the owners willingly manufactured goods "tainted with treason." Consequently, he intended "to get rid of them."[238] Sherman's expulsion of women and children was severe, as was his soldiers' destruction of the factory. However, this was not the first time Sherman permitted his troops to burn private property or threaten Southern women. The first time Sherman's troops implemented hard war was in May 1863. Sherman and Major General Ulysses S. Grant began such actions during their 1863 Vicksburg campaign. Sherman, especially, would continue to allow his soldiers to harass Southern women. Sherman would continue to support these actions and demand that his soldiers bring the war to both Southern men *and* women.

As part of the new strategy, Union commanders allowed, and later encouraged, their troops to harass Southern women, raid private residences, and steal personal belongings, such as jewelry, clothing, and furniture. By 1864, Sherman considered Southern women a threat to his campaign, his men, and the overall war effort, and he observed that although "exempt from conscription, they are as much governed by the rules of war as if in the ranks."[239] Consequently, Sherman permitted his men to harass them and, as the opening account demonstrated, he had the women banished.

War and Gender, Women and Sherman

Gender historians Nina Silber and Catherine Clinton describe the study of gender and the Civil War as a collision between traditional military history, women's history,

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[237] *OR*, vol. 38, pt. 5: 76.
[238] *OR*, vol. 38, pt. 5: 76; *OR*, vol. 38, pt. 5: 92.
[239] *OR*, vol. 38, pt. 5: 73.

and social and cultural history.[240] Gender historians emphasize specific groups of women and men, their wartime experiences, and how those influenced or were influenced by society's gender ideals and expectations.[241] In addition to exploring women and men's lives, scholars have also investigated how numerous factors – race, class, and region – shaped Northerners and Southerners.[242]

Silber and Clinton explain that because Southern women were closer to the "chaos of the battlefield," they frequently encountered Union soldiers. Therefore, Southern women felt the war's repercussions far more directly and frequently than their Northern counterparts.[243] Because of this phenomenon, most studies focus more on Southern women than on their Yankee sisters. While studies on Northern women have increased, analyses of Southern women still dominate the scholarship, though gaps exist. For instance, only a few gender historians have explored Southern women's experiences during periods of Union occupation.[244] Moreover, scholars have largely ignored Southern women as victims of hard war, especially during the Army of the Tennessee's 1863 Vicksburg campaign. Hoping to fill this historiographical void, this thesis offers a new interpretation by examining Grant and Sherman's hard war strategy in Mississippi.

As part of the growing field of Civil War era gender history, scholars have offered their versions of "Why the South lost" and the evolution of gender roles during wartime. Drew Gilpin Faust argues that, as a result of their wartime experiences, Southern women

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[240] Clinton and Silber, *Battle Scars,* 4.
[241] Clinton and Silber, *Battle Scars*, 7.
[242] Clinton and Silber, *Battle Scars*, 7.
[243] Clinton and Silber, *Battle Scars*, 7.
[244] Whites and Long, *Occupied Women: Gender, Military Occupation, and the American Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2009); Virginia Gould, "'Oh, I Pass Everywhere': Catholic Nuns in the Gulf South during the Civil War," in Clinton and Silber, *Battle Scars*, 41; Catherine Clinton, "'Public Women' and Sexual Politics during the American Civil War," in Clinton and Silber, *Battle Scars*, 61; Michael Fellman, "Women and Guerilla Warfare," in Clinton and Silber, *Divided Houses*, 147.

"sought to invent new foundations for self-definition and self-worth."[245] As more men went to war and left women to manage the home front, Southern women became disillusioned with the South's idealized gender roles and the war.[246] Faust further explains that while Southern women attempted to maintain household control, their most significant problem was slave management. The peculiar institution depended on dominance, which challenged the concept of women as submissive and passive. Their inability to master their slaves and their homes, especially with the influx of Union troops, eventually undermined Southern women's support for both slavery and the Confederate cause.[247] Frustration with their own incompetence persuaded many Southern women, as Faust argues, that the "institution had become a greater inconvenience than benefit."[248]

Confirming Faust's assertion, one woman exclaimed in March 1864, "Oh! This cruel war! Ma, sometimes I feel about desperate, and almost wish I could take a Rip Van Winkle sleep till all is over and settled."[249] Faust further contends that desperation moved Southern women to insist that their men desert or surrender, because they too had "needs, interests, and even rights, not just duties and obligations."[250] In her article,

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[245] Faust, *Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War,* 7.

[246] Faust, *Mothers of Invention.*

[247] Sarah Katherine Stone, *Brokenburn: The Journal of Kate Stone, 1861-1868* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1955, 1972), 3, 8, 14, 32-33; Giselle Roberts, *The Confederate Belle* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 55-56; Faust, *Mothers of Invention*, 56. For more information on Southerners' wartime roles, see Francis Butler Simkins and James Welch Patton, *The Women of the Confederacy* (Richmond, VA: Garrett and Massie, 1936), 111-16; Drew Gilpin Faust, "Trying to Do a Man's Business: Slavery, Violence, and Gender in the American Civil War" *Gender and History* 4 (June 1992) 2:197-214; George C. Rable, *Civil Wars: Women and the Crisis of Southern Nationalism* (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 112-21; Laura F. Edwards, *Scarlett Doesn't Live Here Anymore: Southern Women in the Civil War Era* (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 77-79.

[248] Faust, *Mothers of Invention*, 73.

[249] Louisa Henry to "Ma," 28 March 1864, Clark-Boddie Family Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi, quoted in Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War,* 163.

[250] Faust, *Mothers of Invention*, 235.

"Altars of Sacrifice: Confederate Women and the Narratives of War," Faust concludes that a main reason the South surrendered was because Southern women demanded it.[251]

The feminine ideal of the patriotic Confederate woman emphasized female self-sacrifice. This not only meant sending their loved ones to battle, but also assuming domestic endeavors for the war effort.[252] During the war Southern women knitted socks, sewed uniforms, prepared supplies, and entered the workforce to equip the army. These efforts combined with their letters to soldiers sustained military morale. For young ladies, this antebellum model shaped their support for the Confederacy and defined their wartime duties.[253] A major part of the feminine ideal was the preservation of honor. While male family members defended honor on the battlefield, Southern society expected women to uphold honor on the home front, especially in the form of "domestic patriotism."[254]

Historian Timothy Smith reveals that Mississippi women needed to fill roles previously relegated to men. Kate Foster from Okolona, Mississippi reported that "They not only had to care for the children, and the stock, manage the negroes and the farms, but they had to make clothes and food for those at home and for those far away in the army. The long-discarded arts of spinning and weaving and dyeing with the bark of trees were revived. Many a Confederate soldier lies shrouded in grey made by his wife's hand or that of some other loved one."[255]

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[251] Faust, "Altars of Sacrifice," 171.
[252] Roberts, *The Confederate Belle*, 43.
[253] Roberts, *The Confederate Belle*, 43, 48.
[254] Annie Harper, *Annie Harper's Journal: A Southern Mother's Legacy* (Denton, TX: Flower Mound Writing Co., 1983), 12; Roberts, *The Confederate Belle*, 47.
[255] Kate Foster Diary, 15 November 1863, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, quoted in Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War,* 162.

Southern women's support of the war was undeniably linked to Confederate soldier morale. Faust states that "from the outset the home front was acknowledged to exert significant control over military morale," and as desertions and dissatisfaction increased the connection became clearer. As illustrated by numerous women's letters to newspapers, politicians, and their male counterparts, women's approval decided the war's outcome.[256] Therefore, Union persecution of Southern women affected the Confederate war effort. By harassing women and threatening their femininity, Union officers indirectly attacked Southern manhood and their ability to protect their homes. Civil War scholars explain that preservation of home was a driving reason for Southern soldier enlistment. By raiding Southern homes, Northern soldiers attacked the very thing Southerners were trying to protect.[257]

Building from Faust's suggestion that wartime demands "went right to the core of the antebellum gender quid pro quo between men and women, in which men had promised to 'protect' and women had agreed to 'obey,'" historian LeeAnn Whites also explains that the Civil War challenged Southern whites' males' masculinity and power.[258] When Union soldiers invaded their homes, white Southern men discovered that they could not sustain their masculine identities as warriors any longer.[259] Therefore, Whites

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[256] Faust, "Altars of Sacrifice," 180-181.

[257] James M. McPherson, *For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Kenneth W. Noe, *Reluctant Rebels: The Confederates Who Joined the Army after 1861* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Aaron Sheehan-Dean, *Why Confederates Fought: Family and Nation in Civil War Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Aaron Sheehan-Dean, "Everyman's War: Confederate Enlistment in Civil War Virginia," *Civil War History* 50 (March 2004): 5-36.

[258] LeeAnn Whites, *Civil War as a Crisis in Gender*, 4-5.

[259] Whites, *Civil War as a Crisis in Gender,* 5.

argues, the war presented Southern white men with "a crisis for their masculinity, a threat to their manhood as it was socially constructed."[260]

Whites also analyzes the "patriarchal republic" of Georgia and the transformation of the society's gender roles and expectations throughout the war. Similar to Faust and Smith, Whites reveals that hostilities originally solidified Southern women's support of the war. However, as the war continued and the death toll rose, Southern social constructions of gender and race changed.[261] An important part of this transformation was the Union's emergent hard war strategy. While Union harassment of women was commonplace during Sherman's 1864 March to the Sea, as illustrated by Joseph Glatthaar's *March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman's Troops in the Savannah and Carolinas Campaigns*, and Jacqueline Glass Campbell's *When Sherman Marched North from the Sea: Resistance on the Confederate Home Front*, it did not begin there.[262] In fact, Grant and Sherman permitted their soldiers to intimidate Southern women, pillage private homes, and to steal jewelry and other personal items to demoralize the Southern civilian population as early as 1863.

Building on the works of William Blair and Gary Gallagher, Jacqueline Glass Campbell examines the interaction between civilians, government officials, and the two armies, and contends that a lack of Confederate nationalism did not cause Confederate defeat. In contrast to Faust and Whites, Campbell argues that white southerners' commitment to the cause persisted into early 1865.[263] According to Campbell,

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[260] Whites, *Civil War as a Crisis in Gender,* 3.

[261] Whites, *Civil War as a Crisis in Gender,* 13-14.

[262] Glatthaar, *March to the Sea and Beyond;* Campbell, *When Sherman Marched North from the Sea.*

[263] William Blair, *Virginia's Private War: Feeding Body and Soul in the Confederacy, 1861-1865* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Gary Gallagher, *The Confederate War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

Sherman's march did not crush Southern resistance, rather Union presence stiffened Southern resolve, particularly among the region's white women. In an effort to protect themselves, their possessions, and the Confederacy, these women resisted Union incursions verbally and sometimes physically.[264]

LeeAnn Whites and Alecia P. Long, in their edited collection *Occupied Women: Gender, Military Occupation, and the American Civil War*, demand that women be integrated into the Civil War's military history by obliterating the distinction between home front and battlefront. According to Whites, women acted "not as the hapless victims of collateral damage of Union occupation or as the occasional and atypical politicized woman but as the critical bottom rail of the war of occupation."[265]

In response, Lisa Tendrich Frank examines Sherman's troops raids on women's bedrooms during the March to the Sea. In her review of Sherman's hard war strategy, Frank asserts that many women in Georgia and South Carolina believed that soldiers would not harass them because of their gender. Nevertheless, Union soldiers enthusiastically raided women's most personal spaces, their bedrooms, and personal belongings. Frank reveals that by late 1864, Sherman allowed, and even encouraged, such behavior because he understood that to defeat the Confederate armies, the Union had to subdue Confederate civilians.[266] She further argues, "gender shaped the interactions and reactions of Confederate women and the Northern soldiers that they faced."[267] Tendrich contends that Federal officers encouraged their men to raid women's bedrooms and personal spaces as a way of demoralizing the civilian population and

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[264] Campbell, *When Sherman Marched North from the Sea.*

[265] Whites and Long, *Occupied Women*, 6.

[266] Lisa Tendrich Frank, "Bedrooms as Battlefields: The Role of Gender Politics in Sherman's March" in Whites and Long, *Occupied Women.*

[267] Frank, "Bedrooms as Battlefields," 33.

winning the war. Therefore, while some women remained steadfast in their support of the Confederate war effort, many women –both rich and poor – revoked their support and told their men to return home.[268]

Union troops harassed Southern women and invaded their personal spaces in late 1864. For instance, in 1864 Thomas T. Taylor, an Ohio soldier, wrote that his fellow soldiers smashed "jars, dishes, furniture, &c" and "then robbed beds of their bedding, wardrobes of their clothing, and cut open [mattresses]."[269] According to Taylor, soldiers considered these actions concurrent to Sherman's order "to forage liberally" as part of his Special Order No. 120 that launched his Atlanta campaign.[270] This thesis argues, however, that Union commanders initially began embracing such tactics during the 1863 Vicksburg campaign. For instance, in Jackson, Sherman told his troops to make "everything public not needed by us" inoperable.[271] While this is not as extreme as his orders in 1864, it was different from the Union's early policy of conciliation. The 1863 Vicksburg campaign began hard war's evolution as an accepted strategy.

Hard War in the Home

While in Jackson, Grant oversaw the evacuation and burning of the Pearl River Mills cotton factory. Like the Roswell, Georgia factory, the owners claimed to be producing cloth for civilians, but primarily manufactured uniforms for the Confederate Army. In response to this treason, Grant announced, "They had done enough work" and demanded it be leveled.[272] When one of the owners approached Grant and Sherman to

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[268] Frank, "Bedrooms as Battlefields," 33.

[269] Thomas T. Taylor, 23 November 1863, Diary, Taylor Collection, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, quoted in Frank, "Bedrooms as Battlefields."

[270] Sherman, Special Field Orders No. 120, 9 November 1864, *OR*, vol. 36, pt. 3: 713.

[271] Special Order No. 105, 14 May 1863, *OR,* vol. 24, pt. 3: 312.

[272] Grant, *Memoirs*, 269.

spare the factory, because it employed many of the city's young women and poor families, Sherman replied, "The United States could better afford to compensate the Greens for their property, and feed the poor families thus thrown out of employment than to spare the property."[273]

Sherman added that if the poor families cannot feed themselves, the Union Army would provide food, but reminded the families that they should seek employment or refuge in "some more peaceful land."[274] Neither Grant nor Sherman sympathized with the female workers or the owners. In fact, years later when the Green brothers requested compensation because Northern troops destroyed their "private" property, Grant declined.[275] As with the Roswell factory, the Greens may have owned the Pearl River Mills cotton factory, but the stores' purpose and location and Greens' Confederate loyalties resulted in their factory's destruction.[276]

Grant and Sherman's ambiguous definitions of private and government property formed a crucial part of their early hard war strategy. Union soldiers were not only shattering items of potential military benefit, but also Southern civilian and soldier morale. By ordering their troops to despoil *any* buildings or items that "could be easily converted," Grant and Sherman approved excessive destruction and confiscation.[277] Union soldiers in 1863 took advantage of this order and ransacked private homes, stole jewelry and clothing, took food, livestock, draft animals, and damaged other items that did not truly pose a threat to the U.S. Army.[278] For example, in addition to military

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[273] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 754.
[274] *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 1: 754.
[275] Grant, *Memoirs*, 269-270.
[276] "In the Matter of the Claim of Charles Delano," Charles Delano Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi.
[277] Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 297.
[278] Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson."

buildings, Union troops also raided the *Daily Mississippian* (newspaper) office, the post office, the Governor's mansion, and Greens' bank, Ambrogia's grocery, Allen & Ligon's store, and numerous houses.[279]

Contemporary news reports and several civilians' writings reveal that Sherman's men ruined many, if not all, Jackson's private residences in May 1863.[280] This thesis argues that Sherman permitted – or at least failed to punish – such destruction. The similarities between soldiers' activities in Mississippi to those later in Georgia and the Carolinas illustrate that the Union was formulating this new type of warfare one year earlier in Jackson. By not punishing the unnecessary destruction of private residences, especially women's bedrooms and personal items, Sherman introduced an innovative hard war strategy.

The demolition of the Southern home front also had an adverse affect on Confederate soldier morale. As revealed by historians Drew Gilpin Faust, Stephanie McCurry, and LeeAnn Whites, Southern women and men at home commonly wrote to their family members in the Confederate Army of their dismay and such reports most likely disheartened Southern soldiers.[281] For instance, William A. Bisland, a member of the 26th Regiment, Louisiana Volunteers, linked his fiancée's morale with his own. By August 1862, his fiancée's letters became more despondent and gloomy, and Bisland worried about her devotion to the cause. Bisland regarded Caroline's emotional outbursts as unwomanly and unpatriotic. He chastised her, "This is the time when we must keep a

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[279] Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson."

[280] Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson"; "Rebel Account"; "Colonel Bussy's Expedition"; Ranlett, "The Capture of Jackson"; Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States*; "The Siege of Vicksburg and Some Personal Experiences Connected Therewith"; Allan C. Ashcraft, ed., "Mrs. Russell and the Battle of Raymond, Mississippi," *The Journal of Mississippi History* 25 (January 1963) 1: 38-39.

[281] Faust, *Mothers of Invention*; Faust, "Altars of Sacrifice"; Whites, *Civil War as a Crisis in Gender*.

bold front and it is rather a sign of weakness to despond. If we cannot bear some of the ills and trials of like, we are not deserving of our independence—and at the same time it shows a distrust of the good providence who can overrule all these things to our good." Bisland concluded, "Cheer up, and be more of a woman, more deserving of the esteem and affection of a soldier."[282] Months later, his fiancée remained depressed and Bisland told her to knit socks, to keep the home fires burning and to sustain morale by writing optimistic letters to soldiers away at war.[283]

Historian Timothy Smith also explains that by summer 1863, many Southern women felt dismayed and lost with the large and destructive incursions into their state. One woman wrote in May 1863, "Truly this is a day of darkness for our nation, but let us hope that it is soon to pass; the darkest hour is just before day; it has been said."[284] Another wrote in July 1863, "I felt as if our Country had cast us off."[285] The fall of Jackson and Vicksburg played heavily on these women's minds, as did the harassment from Federal soldiers during Grant's campaign for Vicksburg and Jackson in 1863.[286] It is no wonder that Faust and others argue that demoralization of the home front contributed to the Confederacy's surrender. For instance, many Jackson families returned to find their homes burned or looted.[287] The *Brandon Republican* declared, "nearly all private residences were entered, trunks forced open, the clothing torn to

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[282] William Bisland to Caroline Pride, 11 August 1862, Bisland-Shields Family Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi, quoted in Roberts, *The Confederate Belle*, 76-77.

[283] Bisland to Pride, 9 February 1863, quoted in Roberts, *The Confederate Belle*, 77.

[284] Loulie to Husband, 17 May 1863, John Oakley Family Papers, Mississippi State University, Mississippi State, Mississippi, http://digital.library.msstate.edu/collections/document.php?CISOROOT=/ASERL&CISOPTR=199&REC=17 (accessed 19 March 2012).

[285] Elizabeth Christie Brown Diary, 7-10 July 1863, University of Mississippi, University, Mississippi, quoted in Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War,* 180.

[286] Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War*, 180.

[287] Ranlett, "The Capture of Jackson," 351-352; Correspondence, Walton-Purdom Family Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi.

pieces, jewelry, silverware and provisions taken."[288] Soldiers took "merchandise, books, papers, and money" from numerous stores and residences.[289] Luther S. Baechtel, a Treasury Department clerk noted "The Yankees broke into my room, broke open the boxes, [and] stole my flute."[290] Along with the loss of his flute, boots, brushes and comb, a mosquito net, and two vases, the Union troops left him with "nothing but books in bad condition, papers, and furniture."[291]

This was the experience of many residents after the Union's first occupation of the city in May 1863, and many other Southerners in 1864 and 1865. By taking or destroying private items of no military benefit, such as jewelry, dresses, and silverware, Northern soldiers showed that they could tear apart the Confederacy from the private sphere. These actions that Grant and Sherman permitted in 1863, and would later encourage, brought the war to the Southern home front.

Jane Clark Pickett of Jackson, who fled the Yankee's arrival, described her fear in July 1863, "Oh! I cannot grasp the great events passing through our much loved country." She continued, "The woe and desolation weeping all around us, we and many of our friends driven from homes, and which even now may lay in ashes."[292] As with many other Mississippi residents after Grant's 1863 Vicksburg campaign, she "received letters continually from the overseer, and Mr. Craig whose family is at our House, if it is still

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[288] Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson."

[289] Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson."

[290] Luther S. Baechtel Diary, 4 June 1863, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi, quoted in Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War*, 41; William D. McCain, *The Story of Jackson: A History of the Capital of Mississippi 1821-1851*, vol. 1 (Jackson, MS: J.F. Her Publishing Company, 1953), 198.

[291] Luther S. Baechtel Diary, 4 June 1863.

[292] Jane Clark Pickett to Mother, 25 July 1863, Clark-Boddie Family Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi, quoted in Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War*, 169-170.

standing, until the fall of Vicksburg; since then we have received none from them."[293] It was not until months later that they received the news that their house, along with a friend's, "has been burned down, and all the negroes taken."[294] She further related, "if the fortunes of war should threaten me with degradation I am not compelled to live."[295]

Pickett later heard of "the sacking [of] our houses on both places," and how the Union soldiers "told the negroes they were free & had the right to everything they say; at that the negroes rushed into the house, and now the great effort was who could get the most."[296] She went on to describe, "my libraries were robbed of their contents," and that the Union troops said, "they had the greatest treat they had in Miss. in my pantry among cordials, wines, & preserves."[297] So as with other Jackson families, not only did the Federals help themselves to provisions, but also unnecessary items, such as books.

Letitia Dabney Miller of Raymond, Mississippi also witnessed the Union's first practice of hard war when they raided her father's farm. Federal soldiers burned up all the fences for their cooking pots, then they raided the hen house and the smoke house. They also drove off her family's cow and calf. She reported that, after the Yankees' visit, her family only consumed "game, partridges, and squirrels" to survive.[298] Along with provisions, the Federal soldiers also took the Millers' china, books, and shoes that were most likely in the most private of rooms – parlor or bedrooms. These destructive actions

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[293] Jane Clark Pickett to Mother, 25 July 1863.
[294] Jane Clark Pickett to Mother, 25 July 1863.
[295] Jane Clark Pickett to Mother, 25 July 1863.
[296] Jane Clark Pickett to Mother, 23 September 1863.
[297] Jane Clark Pickett to Mother, 23 September 1863.
[298] Letitia Dabney Miller Recollections, 1926, Letitia Dabney Miller Recollections #1844-z, Southern Historical Collection, The Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 11, quoted in Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War*, 103.

performed by Union soldiers and permitted by their officers, formed an integral part of the early hard war strategy and demoralized the Southern civilian population.[299]

Mrs. J. W. Russell, who lived in Diamond Hill, Mississippi, also witnessed Union troops' actions during Grant's Inland campaign. Living near the intersection of Fourteen Mile Creek and the Utica-Raymond road, a few miles southwest of Raymond, McPherson's troops pillaged her plantation after the Battle of Raymond. She informed her husband, who was serving in Tennessee, that Union soldiers approached her in search of food and supplies. Russell stated, "I let them have the keys, and they ransacked the smokehouse, took most of our meat, took all the tobacco."[300]

Although Russell claimed soldiers treated her with the "utmost politeness," some were as "ravenous as wolves" and took cows, milk, every mule, chickens, and her bed clothes. As with the Union's ensuing destruction of Jackson and their raid of the Miller farm, Federal soldiers not only took the necessary items, but also Russell's bed clothes. The act of acquiring the latter, most likely taken from her bedroom, infiltrated her private sphere. Even though historian Nina Silber contends that Confederate women combined the public and private spheres during wartime, a Southern woman's bedroom was still her sanctuary.[301] By disturbing that private place, Union soldiers invaded one of the last places not touched by the war.

Along with raiding her private spaces – although Union soldiers did not disturb her wardrobe – Russell explained that Northern troops frightened her slaves, especially the females. She noted, "the Yankees forced or threatened & persuaded the negroes to

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[299] Letitia Dabney Miller Recollections, 1926, 10.

[300] Ashcraft, "Mrs. Russell and the Battle of Raymond, Mississippi," 38-40.

[301] Nina Silber, *Gender and the Sectional Conflict* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Frank, "Bedrooms as Battlefields."

go."[302] They told one of her female slaves, Sarah, that if she did not join them they "would burn every house on the place," and eventually *all* of her slaves were gone. Russell also recorded, "every place in country has been visited by them."[303] Although Grant's men left her with little as they pushed through the state, Russell did not seem entirely demoralized by the experience in her letter. This is most likely because, according to the antebellum ideal, Southern women did not show fear or weakness publicly. However, as illustrated below, some Southern women did express fear and distress privately, especially in their diaries.

Historian Timothy Smith explained that over the years, the idea emerged that white Southern women remained united and loyal in the face of the Federals, because their letters to the battle front appeared steadfast. One Natchez minister recorded, "The cheerfulness with which they submitted to every trial and the energy with which they provided for the welfare and comfort of the soldier, whether in the field or hospital, cheered and sustained more than every other earthly consideration."[304]

Yet, as seen in the women's own diaries, not all were as loyal or brave as they seemed. According to the ideal, Southern women could not admit their distress publicly, but they filled their private writings with suffering. For instance, Kate Foster explained in her diary, "We ought to remember that we all have relatives, friends or lovers in our army and if they these things it might weaken a strong army in time of battle and sicken s

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[302] Ashcraft, "Mrs. Russell and the Battle of Raymond, Mississippi," 39.

[303] Ashcraft, "Mrs. Russell and the Battle of Raymond, Mississippi," 39.

[304] Reverend J. Whitner Kennedy, "Life of the Reverend Benjamin Chase, As Recorded in his Own Hand, In a Two Year Diary," Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi, 10, quoted in Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War,* 175.

stout & loving heart."[305] Illustrating women's need to keep suffering in their private thoughts, Russell in her letter reported, "I have borne it all very cheerfully, so far."[306]

Yet in their diaries and private letters to family members also on the home front, women expressed their fears openly. For instance, with the fall of Jackson and Vicksburg one woman wrote in July 1863, "our state has gone up," and she feared that she might not be able to send another letter before "our State is entirely gone." She later confided, "I want this troublesome time of war to pass away swiftly and once more to realize peace & independence."[307] Sarah Poates also expressed her want for the war to end in her diary. After years of hardship, her view of war began to change; and by 1864 she confided, "It does appear to me I cannot live if he [her husband] has to stay away from home. I suppose I shall endure it someway, and as others are obliged to. I do hope though that he may be permitted to stay at home."[308] Months later, she complained, "When will this cruel war end? I fear not soon, I am so lonely, so wretched, there is nothing to live for but sad stern duty, no further pleasure since my dear husband is away." She later specified, "Duty, duty, only to sustain me."[309]

Historian Timothy Smith confirmed that, like Sarah Poates and Alice Sears, many Mississippi women found their support for the Confederacy waning with more and more hardship, especially after the 1863 Vicksburg campaign. Yet, they could not express

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[305] Kate Foster Diary, 20 September 1863, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, quoted in Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War*, 163.

[306] Ashcraft, "Mrs. Russell and the Battle of Raymond, Mississippi," 40.

[307] Lizzie to Cousin, 12 July 1863; Lizzie to Cousin, 12 September 1863, Matthew N. Love Papers, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, quoted in Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War,* 166.

[308] Sarah Fitch Poates Diary, 14 August 1864, Asa Fitch Papers, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, quoted in Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War,* 172.

[309] Sarah Fitch Poates Diary, 28 and 30 August, 3, 4, 18 September, 27 December 1864, quoted in Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War*, 173.

such dismay publicly according to the antebellum ideal.[310] However, Russell's and Pickett's letters still conveyed extreme devastation to Confederate soldiers away from home. Furthermore, the growing hardships on the home front, compounded with an increased threat from Federal soldiers in their state, women like Jane Pickett began to feel demoralized.

Hard War in July

Union troops continued to assault civilians without reprimand in July when Sherman occupied Jackson a second time. Proud of his achievements, Sherman informed Grant, "The inhabitants are subjugated. They cry aloud for mercy. The land is devastated for 30 miles around."[311] Union troops also raided private bedrooms in New Albany (northern Mississippi) during July 1864. One woman attempted to hide her valuables in a secret compartment over her piazza. However, the Union soldiers searched the house, "All day working like ants," and eventually uncovered her hiding place. Along with finding her valuables, the soldiers stole household items such as clothes, beds, and blankets.[312]

These, like the ones taken from Jackson and Raymond households in 1863, were most likely in bedrooms, parlors, and other private spaces. Invasions into these private areas demoralized Southern women. The Union Army continued to implement such actions in 1864 and 1865. Historian Lisa Tendrich Frank explains that, Sherman's men purposefully entered bedrooms to demoralize the Southern women, especially in Georgia

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[310] Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War*, 175.

[311] Sherman to Grant, 18 July 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 2: 529.

[312] Samuel Andrew Agnew Diary, 10 June 1864, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, http://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/agnew/agnew.html (accessed 19 March 2012); Mrs. W. F. Smith, "Notes and Documents: The Yankees in New Albany: Letter of Elizabeth Jane Beach, July 29, 1864," *Journal of Mississippi History* 2 (January 1940) 1: 42-48, quoted in Smith, *Mississippi in the Civil War,* 164.

and the Carolinas.[313] Reports such as these wore down many Confederate soldiers and eventually contributed to Union victory in 1865.

Further Developing Hard War

After Sherman's destruction of Jackson in May and July 1863, he would continue to target Southern civilians with his Meridian expedition. As with Mississippi's capital, Sherman not only wrecked Meridian's rail junction, but also private property.[314] Sherman contended that such devastation, similar to his success in Jackson, would "paralyze" all of Mississippi and Mobile, Alabama.[315] Mirroring Jackson, Sherman's men "worked hard and with a will, in that work of destruction, with axes, sledges, crowbars, clawbars, and with fire, and I have no hesitation in pronouncing the work well done. Meridian with its Depots, Storehouses, Arsenals, offices, Hospitals, Hotels, and Cantonments, no longer exists."[316]

Along with overseeing the burning, confiscating, or destruction of anything that could be easily converted to "hostile uses," Sherman also struck private residences. In January 1864, shortly before he launched his Meridian expedition, Sherman remarked,

> So long as non-combatants remain in their houses and keep to their accustomed peaceful business, their opinions and prejudices can in no wise influence the war, and therefore should not be noticed; *but if any one comes out into the public streets and creates disorder, he or she should be punished, restrained, or banished. . .*These are well-established principles of war, and the people of the South having appealed to war, are barred from appealing for protection to our constitution, which they have practically and publicly defied. They have appealed to war, and must abide its rules and laws.[317]

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[313] Frank, "Bedrooms as Battlefields."

[314] Robert C. Black, III, *The Railroads of the Confederacy* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1952), 240; Bearrs, *Sherman's Forgotten Campaign,* 4; Foster, *Sherman's Mississippi Campaign*, 16.

[315] Sherman to Rawlins, 14 October 1863, *OR,* vol. 30, pt. 4: 355-356.

[316] *OR*, vol. 32, pt. 1: 176.

[317] Sherman to Sawyer, 31 January 1864, *OR*, vol. 32, pt. 2: 281. Emphasis added.

While this statement regarding noncombatants echoes the 1862 Confiscation Act, Sherman's attention to "women, children, and non-combatants," is noteworthy. Sherman is not only referring to men unable to fight, but also the families of soldiers and guerillas.[318] Historian Mark Grimsley also considers this statement striking because it recognized the existence of inhabitants who were not hostile, but still subject to Federal strategy. Grimsley further states, "Sherman had long endorsed the existing Union policy of distinguishing between Unionists, neutral, and actively hostile Southern civilians."[319] Therefore, this letter confirms that by January 1864 Sherman had accepted the new Federal policy of hard war that he began embracing during the 1863 Vicksburg campaign.[320]

While in Jackson in May 1863 Sherman told Brigadier General Joseph A. Mower, "The feeling of pillage and booty will injure the morals of the troops, and bring disgrace to the cause."[321] But earlier that day, he informed Mower to "Push the work of destruction, especially types, presses, sugar, and everything public not needed by us. The work should be done by 10 a.m. to-morrow. . .You must work at night, if necessary, to destroy what *might* be useful to an enemy."[322] Like Grant's initial emphasis on "all," Sherman's use of the word "might" illustrates the aimed extent of the destruction. Sherman expected his men to destroy anything that could be possibly "converted" or "useful to an enemy." As seen later in Georgia, Union troops considered this all-encompassing and obscure description to include private property.[323] Although Sherman

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[318] Sherman to Sawyer, 31 January 1864, *OR*, vol. 32, pt. 2: 281.
[319] Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War,* 172-173.
[320] Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 172.
[321] Sherman to Mower, 15 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 315.
[322] Sherman to Mower, 15 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 314-315. Emphasis added.
[323] Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 297; Sherman to Mower, 15 May 1863, *OR*, vol. 24, pt. 3: 314-315; Thomas T. Taylor, 23 November 1863, Diary, Taylor Collection, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia.

only plainly stated in 1864 that his soldiers should punish, restrain, or banish disorderly Southern civilians and *now* they must "abide" to the rules of war, Grant and Sherman began to craft their gendered hard war strategy a year earlier during the 1863 Vicksburg campaign.[324]

During his Meridian expedition, which historian Buckley T. Foster's argues was Sherman's true "dress rehearsal" for hard war, Sherman's men destroyed numerous private residences, hospitals, hotels, and offices.[325] Similar to the Union's sack of Jackson, these were not military buildings, but since the enemy could easily convert them to hostile uses, Sherman allowed his men burn the buildings. Sherman continued to be unbothered by wanton destruction. For instance, on his march back to Vicksburg after his successful and destructive Meridian expedition, Sherman claimed, "many cotton-gins and piles of cotton were burned by our soldiers and by negroes without orders and detection. . .I attach little importance to these matters, but the great result attained is the hardihood and confidence imparted in command, which is now better fitted for war."[326] As seen earlier in spring 1863, these actions – encouraged or unpunished – demoralized the civilian population and the Confederate military.

Georgia and Beyond

Recognizing this connection between the two fronts, Sherman declared in September 1864, "If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeing. If they want peace, they and their

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[324] Sherman to Sawyer, 31 January 1864, Rachel Sherman Thorndike, ed., *The Sherman Letters: Correspondence between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894), 228-30; Sherman to Sawyer, 31 January 1864, *OR*, vol. 32, pt. 2: 281.

[325] *OR*, vol. 32, pt. 1: 173-174, 176; Foster, *Sherman's Mississippi Campaign*, x:

[326] *OR*, vol. 32, pt. 1: 177.

relatives must stop the war."[327] While Sherman did not state this plainly until 1864, Grant and the other officers' growing acceptance of plundering shows the evolution of the Union's strategy and acceptance of their troops' attacks on the home front.

Sherman's targeting of military buildings and equipment would intensify with the March to the Sea. Historian Joseph Glatthaar suggests that Sherman's aim was to demonstrate the "terribleness of war."[328] For instance, after Sherman's destruction of Jackson (May and July 1863), Meridian (February 1863), and his deportation of the Roswell, Georgia women, Union troops continued their devastation in the town of New Manchester on Sweet Water Creek due west of Atlanta.[329] Like the four hundred Roswell mill women, the Federal Army loaded the female factory workers of New Manchester into boxcars, given several days' rations, and taken to Kentucky and Indiana until the end of the war, after Union troops burned their place of employment.

Sherman would continue to implement hard war strategy in Atlanta, destroying railroads, military materials, and private residences, alike. For example, after Atlanta's surrender, Sherman ordered the city's citizens to evacuate. He explained to Halleck that he evacuated the city's inhabitants so his troops could use "all the houses of Atlanta for military storage and occupation."[330] Additionally, Sherman wanted to rebuild the city's defenses. But to make these lines the most secure "with the necessary citadels and redoubts" Sherman needed to destroy many residences. Sherman further detailed, "As captors we have a right to it…the residence here of the families of our enemies would be

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[327] Sherman to Halleck, 4 September 1864, Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 479.
[328] Glatthaar, *The March to the Sea and Beyond*, 6.
[329] Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 439.
[330] Sherman to Halleck, 20 September 1864, Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 485.

a temptation and a means to keep up a correspondence dangerous and hurtful to our cause."[331]

Sherman also explained his decision to Confederate General John Bell Hood. Hood chastised Sherman's "studied and ingenious cruelty," and declared, "In the name of God and humanity I protest, believing that you will find that you are expelling from their homes and firesides the wives and children of a brave people."[332] In response Sherman reminded Hood, "You, yourself, burned dwelling-houses along your parapet, and I have seen to-day fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable because they stood in the way of your forts and men."[333] Sherman also reminded Hood, "General Hardee did the same at Jonesborough, and General Johnston did the same last summer at Jackson, Mississippi."[334]

Revealing his acceptance of hard war strategy, Sherman declared that Hood and his commanders "have plunged a nation into war, dark and cruel war; who dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our arsenals and forts that were left in the honorable custody of peaceful ordnance sergeants…hated Lincoln Government; tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into rebellion, in spite of themselves…turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships; expelled Union families by the thousands; burned their houses and declared by an act of your Congress the confiscation of all debts due Northern men for goods had and received."[335] Sherman similarly replied to Atlanta's mayor and city council, "War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I

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[331] Sherman to Halleck, 20 September 1864, Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 485.
[332] Hood to Sherman, 9 September 1864, Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 487.
[333] Sherman to Hood, 10 September 1864, Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 487-488.
[334] Sherman to Hood, 10 September 1864, Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 487-488.
[335] Sherman to Hood, 10 September 1864, Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 487-488.

know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our country…."[336]

Sherman's earlier raids on Jackson in May and July 1863 showed him that his soldiers' mass destruction and harassment was effective and could be used to subdue the Confederacy. Although, this change did not happen immediately, beginning in Jackson, it evolved to become the devastating reality of Sherman's March to the Sea. For example, in Jackson, Sherman's men destroyed most of the houses south of Pearl Street and State Street, and inflicted five million dollars worth of damage in a town of 2,100 people.[337] In Atlanta, a city of almost ten thousand Sherman aimed to "make Georgia howl."[338] By October 1864, Sherman voiced, "We are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and we must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war."[339]

These orders echo Sherman's earlier sentiments to Halleck in September 1863, in which Sherman contended that the Federal Army had the right to "remove and destroy every obstacle – if need be, take every life, every acre of land, every particle of property, everything that to us seems proper."[340] This statement further mirrors his earlier May 1863 orders in Jackson, when Sherman told his soldiers to make "everything public not

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[336] Sherman to Calhoun, 12 September 1864, Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 493-494.

[337] Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson"; "Interesting from the South"; U.S. Federal Eighth Census.

[338] Sherman to Grant, 9 October 1864, Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 519; Stephen Davis, "Civil War: Atlanta Home Front," *The New Georgia Encyclopedia*, http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org /nge/Article.jsp?id=h-824 (accessed 18 February 2012).

[339] Sherman to Grant, 9 October 1864, Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 519; Sherman to Halleck, 24 December 1864, Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 588.

[340] Sherman to Halleck, 17 September 1863, Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 309.

needed by us" inoperable.[341] Therefore, Sherman and Grant first implemented their hard war strategy in spring 1863, months before Sherman's Meridian campaign, and a year before his infamous March to the Sea.

Conclusion

The Union's destruction of Jackson, Mississippi in May 1863 was the Army of the Tennessee's first acceptance of hard war strategy. Grant and Sherman would continue to use the hard war strategy they begun in 1863 during their later 1864 and 1865 campaigns. Neither Grant nor Sherman ever explicitly ordered the harassment of Southern women in 1863, but their lax punishment for those who did demonstrates that Union commanders were considering hard war one year earlier than initially realized. The intimidation of Southern women loyal to the Confederacy as a way of attacking their men was building in 1863, and Sherman would enthusiastically implement it during his later campaigns. Sherman summed up his own decision to wage hard war against Southern civilians in February 1865, in a letter to Confederate General Wade Hampton, when he stated, "Personally I regret the bitter feelings engendered by this war, but they were to be expected, and I simply allege that those who struck the first blow and made war inevitable ought not, in fairness, to reproach us for the natural consequences."[342]

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[341] Special Order No. 105, 14 May 1863, *OR,* vol. 24, pt. 3: 312.
[342] Sherman to Hampton, 24 February 1865.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

In March 1865, General William T. Sherman met with President Abraham Lincoln aboard the presidential flagship, the *River Queen*, to discuss Confederate General Joseph Johnston's activities in Georgia and the Carolinas. A concerned Lincoln asked Sherman about the possibility of Johnston using the railroads to renew the offensive. Sherman replied proudly, "My bummers don't do things by halves. Every rail, after having been placed over a hot fire, has been twisted as crooked as a ram's-horn, and they never can be used again."[343] Although Southerners would not nickname these men – skilled in destruction – bummers until 1864, Union commanders began to realize their efficiency during the 1863 Vicksburg campaign.

Grant's instructions to destroy the rail line are not simply conventional warfare. Grant did not order Sherman to demolish bridges and roads merely to protect his rear, but to debilitate the city. Additionally, Grant did not explicitly forbid the demolition or theft of private property. These two facets demonstrate that the Union's sack of Jackson in May 1863 was the first implementation of hard war as an approved strategy. Along with Grant's ordered and Sherman's implemented destruction of Mississippi's capital in May 1863, the Union's acceptance of General Order No. 100 or Leiber's Code in April 1863 also ushered in hard war.

With the Union's destruction of Jackson and Meridian, Mississippi, both Grant and Sherman began to understand that they had to sabotage the Confederacy's roads and industry to end the war. Therefore, Sherman continued to implement such during his Atlanta campaign. Marching through the heart of Georgia, Sherman encouraged tactics

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[343] Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 684-685.

he allowed his troops to use during the 1863 Vicksburg campaign. For instance, Sherman's men lived off the land, burned Atlanta and the state capital, and destroyed the state's rail and telegraph lines.[344]

Like Sherman's operations in Georgia and the Carolinas, Grant's actions in the Eastern Theater also evolved from his earlier hard war strategy. Grant's choice to abandon his supply line during his march to Jackson, combined with Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter's, Colonel Benjamin Grierson's, and Sherman's distractions, inspired his and Sherman's later hard war strategies. More specifically, Grierson's raid through the heart of Mississippi prior to Grant's Inland campaign gave rise to Union Major General Philip H. Sheridan's 1864 Shenandoah Valley campaign. These actions, like Grierson's in 1863, distracted the Confederate forces, divided the enemy's troops, and destroyed many valuable military supplies. Along with confusing the enemy, Sheridan's raids also demoralized the Shenandoah Valley's civilian population. Like Sheridan's later success in Virginia, Grierson's incursion depressed the state's civilian population. While scholars consider the former as hard war, they disregard Grierson's raid as part of the Union's early hard war strategy.

To comprehend fully the North's hard war strategy, Civil War historians must understand that Union commanders began to accept hard war as a viable strategy months before the Sherman's devastating Meridian expedition. In fact, by late 1862 Grant considered the battlefront and home front inherently linked during warfare. To defeat one, the other must also be subdued. Therefore, beginning in spring 1863, both Grant and Sherman permitted their soldiers to harass women and destroy civilians' personal items in Mississippi, and later in Virginia, Georgia, and the Carolinas. As revealed by

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[344] Glatthaar, *The March to the Sea and Beyond*, 5.

numerous historians, such as Timothy B. Smith and Drew Gilpin Faust, these attacks on the home front demoralized and affected the Confederate Army as well.

The Army of the Tennessee's attacks on private property and civilians, along with their destruction of military material, in 1863 ushered in the Union's new hard war strategy. Although Civil War scholars have overlooked the Vicksburg campaign as holding the roots to hard war, by comparing it to later campaigns, this thesis reveals that Union commanders began to accept and develop hard war in 1863. In September 1863, months before Sherman launched Meridian expedition and seeing hard war's success during the Vicksburg campaign, he declared, "We cannot change the hearts and minds of those people of the South, but we can make war so terrible … [and] make them so sick of war that generations would pass away before they would again appeal to it."[345]

[345] Sherman, *Personal Memoirs*, 313.

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